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TAKING STOCK: INSIDER AND OUTSIDER 
TRADING BY CONGRESS 
JEANNE L. SCHROEDER* 
ABSTRACT 
Spring 2012 saw the enactment of the “Stop Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge Act of 2012” or “STOCK Act.” It supposedly repealed an ex-
emption from the federal securities laws that made insider trading by 
members of Congress “totally legal.” As every securities lawyer knows, 
however, there never was such an exemption. Representatives and Senators 
have always been subject to the same rules as the rest of us. It is just that 
insider-trading law is so incoherent that legal scholars sharply disagreed 
as to when, or even if, trading by government officials on the basis of mate-
rial nonpublic information gleaned from their positions would be unlawful. 
It clearly would not constitute “classic” insider trading, and it was not clear 
if it constituted “misappropriation” or “outsider” trading. Consequently, 
despite circumstantial evidence that such trading is not unusual, neither 
the Securities and Exchange Commission nor the Department of Justice 
has ever brought an insider trader action against a member of Congress. 
The STOCK Act was adopted to address a public relations problem. It 
does not solve the real legal problem—the incoherence of insider-trading 
case law that had resulted from the fact that the securities laws neither ex-
pressly prohibit insider trading generally nor define what it might be. It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that Congress ducked this golden opportunity to 
amend the law. Consequently, we are left with the jurisprudential scandal 
that insider trading is largely a federal common-law offense. 
Even after the STOCK Act, it will continue to be difficult to curtail un-
desirable Congressional trading through insider-trading law. All the 
STOCK Act does is to try to shed some light on one element of a potential 
Congressional insider trading case—namely the nature of the relationship 
of members or employees of Congress to the source of certain nonpublic 
information. It does not, however, address the numerous other reasons why 
it is difficult to charge them with insider or outsider trading. Ironically, the 
most important legacy of the STOCK Act might be that it could be construed 
as an implicit endorsement of a controversial SEC regulation applicable to 
other persons. 
                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I wish 
to thank my colleague Richard Bierschbach and the participants of the Workshop on Business 
Law: The Constantly Evolving Law of Insider Trading in the United States at the South 
Eastern Association of Law Schools 2013 Annual Conference for their helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012 Congress enacted the Stop Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge Act of 2012 or STOCK Act.1 It supposedly repealed an ex-
emption from the federal securities laws2 that made insider trading by 
members of Congress “totally legal.”3 As every securities lawyer knows, 
however, there never was such an exemption. Representatives and senators 
have always been subject to the same rules as the rest of us. It is just that 
insider-trading law is so incoherent that legal scholars sharply disagreed as 
to when, or even if, trading by government officials on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information gleaned from their positions would be unlawful.4 It 
would not constitute classic insider trading, and it was not clear if it consti-
tuted misappropriation, or outsider, trading. Consequently, despite circum-
stantial evidence that such trading is not unusual,5 neither the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) nor the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
ever brought an insider-trading action against a member of Congress.6 
The STOCK Act was, in fact, enacted to address a public relations 
problem—the common misperception that Congress exempted itself from 
                                                                                                                         
1 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 
112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
2 Donna M. Nagy, An Interdisciplinary View of Fiduciary Law: Insider Trading, 
Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2011) 
[hereinafter, Nagy, Entrustment] (citing Tom McGinty & Brody Mullins, Lawmaker Aims 
to Outlaw Insider Trading on the Hill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2010, at A9). Later journal 
articles more accurately describe the STOCK Act as “formally” banning certain congres-
sional trading. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Jason Zweig, House Insider Bill Passes with 
New Backers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012, at A1. 
3 One reporter defended Vice Presidential candidate Paul Ryan against accusations of 
improper trading partially on these grounds. Kevin Roose, Paul Ryan Is Not an Insider 
Trader, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 13, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/08/paul 
-ryan-not-an-insider-trader.html. 
4 See infra Part III. Although a group of law students who engaged in an economic analy-
sis of the STOCK Act initially seemed to parrot the sponsors’ assertions that congressional 
trading was then not illegal, their analysis suggests, more accurately, not that Congress 
was exempt from the law, but that it was not clear whether the law, as interpreted, was 
broad enough to cover such trading. See Matthew Barbabella et al., Note, Insider Trading in 
Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199 (2009). Indeed, in the past, I 
have occasionally included a question on my Securities Regulations exam based on such 
a scenario to test my students’ understanding of the vagaries of the law. 
5 See infra notes 15–28. 
6 Reportedly, the SEC “considered, but rejected, investigating” senatorial trading after 
the release of a study suggesting that senators reaped abnormal returns because it thought 
that the cases would be too difficult to win. Joseph N. DiStefano, Senators’ Stock Picks 
Bring Profit, Scrutiny, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 7, 2004), http://articles.philly.com/2004-11 
-07/business/25378433_1_senators-congressional-business-business-information/2. 
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the securities laws.7 It did not address the real legal problem—the incoher-
ence of insider-trading case law that had resulted from the fact that neither the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act)8 nor the regulations pro-
mulgated under it expressly prohibit insider trading generally, let alone define 
what it might be.9 It is unfortunate, therefore, that Congress ducked this 
golden opportunity either to amend the ’34 Act in order to define insider 
trading or, at least, to give the SEC authority to do so. Consequently, we are 
left with the jurisprudential scandal that insider trading is largely a federal 
common-law offense. 
Even after the STOCK Act, it will remain difficult to prohibit certain un-
desirable acts of congressional trading. Current insider-trading law focuses on 
preventing fraud and promoting market integrity.10 In contrast, the STOCK 
Act is primarily worried about the integrity of governmental actors, prevent-
ing corruption, or the appearance of corruption.11 It is hard to see how a law 
                                                                                                                         
7 See Paul D. Brachman, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 
261, 262, 265-66 (2013). 
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006). 
9 Rule 14e-3 does address a narrow aspect of insider trading: it imposes a prophylactic 
rule prohibiting trading by certain persons after “any person has taken a substantial step 
or steps to commence, or has commenced a tender offer.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014). 
The SEC has promulgated two controversial rules purporting to clarify certain elements 
of unlawful trading that have been developed in the case law. See infra Part I.A. 
As far back as 1995, Stephen Bainbridge, in one of the most insightful articles on the 
subject stated: 
The point remains, however, that the federal insider trading prohibition is 
a relatively recent administrative and judicial creation lacking any signifi-
cant statutory basis: “In regulating insider trading under rule 10b-5 the 
lower federal courts and the SEC have been operating without benefit of 
support from the legislative history of the 1934 Act or from the language 
of section 10(b). In plainer words, they have exceeded their authority.” 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1231 (1995) (citation omitted). 
Opponents of a statutory definition of insider trading have argued that it might serve as 
a “roadmap for fraud.” See, e.g., Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAW 145, 150 (1989). Jonathan 
Macey has suggested that 
the SEC in recent years has attempted to expand the contours of the law, 
which makes it easier for them to bring cases, and to keep the law vague 
by refusing to define insider trading. The SEC has thus pursued a policy 
that is consistent with the Commission’s rational self-interest but clearly 
suboptimal from a societal perspective of economizing the performance 
of investigations. 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 646 (2010). 
10 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–58, 687–88 (1997). 
11 See supra note 7. 
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developed around the former concerns can be shoehorned into addressing 
the latter concerns, and the STOCK Act did nothing to add clarity to the 
situation. Consequently, although the STOCK Act might clarify when con-
gressional trading would violate Congress’s internal ethical rules, it is still 
not clear whether the SEC can successfully bring civil actions against, or 
the DOJ can prosecute, members of Congress and their staffers under the 
securities laws. 
All the STOCK Act does is try to shed some light on one element of a 
potential congressional insider-trading case, namely the nature of the rela-
tionship of members or employees of Congress to the source of certain non-
public information. It does not, however, address the numerous other reasons 
why it is difficult to charge them with insider or outsider trading. Ironically, 
the most important legacy of the STOCK Act might be that it could be con-
strued as an implicit endorsement of a controversial SEC regulation appli-
cable to other persons. 
This Article proceeds as follows. I will first give an account of the lan-
guage of the STOCK Act and some background of insider-trading law 
generally. This will be followed by a review of the case law applying the 
misappropriation theory of insider or, more accurately, outsider trading.12 I 
then will ask how the STOCK Act can be expected to interact with the cur-
rent case law.  
I. BACKGROUND 
It has long been suspected that members of Congress frequently trade 
on material nonpublic information that they learned from their official posi-
tions. Perhaps the most well-known evidence of this, albeit circumstantial, 
is a study led by Alan J. Ziobrowski indicating that a group of senators beat 
the market by an average of 12 percent over a five year period,13 a return 
higher than those faked by Ponzi-schemer Bernie Madoff.14 
                                                                                                                         
12 As I, among others, have covered this subject extensively elsewhere, this discussion 
will be very brief. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of 
Martha Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023 (2005), reprinted with slight alterations as 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading, in MARTHA STEWART’S LEGAL 
TROUBLES (Jean MacLoed Heminway ed., 2007) [hereinafter, Schroeder, Envy]. This 
Article is not intended as a survey of the exhaustive literature on this subject. 
13 Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments 
of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 661–62 (2004). 
14 Madoff reported returns that ranged from around 10 to 12 percent, year after year, 
with what looks retrospectively like suspiciously little variation. Paul Sullivan, The Rules 
that Madoff’s Investors Ignored, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/01/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht06wealth.19137611.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
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Earlier versions of what would eventually become the STOCK Act were 
introduced to Congress beginning in 2006.15 The legislation languished until 
2011, when The Wall Street Journal and the television magazine 60 Minutes 
ran exposés of congressional trading.16 Because of the resulting embarrass-
ment and a call for the law’s adoption by President Barack Obama in his 
2012 State of the Union Address,17 a revised version of the STOCK Act was 
quickly adopted by lopsided votes of 417–2 in the House and 96–3 in the 
Senate.18 In order to achieve this, the bill was gutted, removing an express 
definition of unlawful trading and provisions relating to the gathering and 
sale of so-called political information by investment consultants.19 
A. Statutory Framework 
1. The STOCK Act 
The preamble of the STOCK Act states that its purpose is “to prohibit 
Members of Congress and employees of Congress from using nonpublic in-
formation derived from their official positions for personal benefit, and for 
other purposes.”20 
In Section 4, the STOCK Act affirms that “[m]embers of Congress and 
employees of Congress are not exempt from the insider trading prohibitions” 
of the ’34 Act.21 This was an attempt at public relations. It was legally unnec-
essary because it was always clear that the ’34 Act never exempted them. 
What was unclear was how to apply the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading in the governmental context. 
The STOCK Act adds a new subsection to section 21A of the ’34 
Act—that is, the section that otherwise provides for civil penalties for viola-
tions of the ’34 Act—that recognizes a duty (but for only limited purposes) 
relating to information learned from a congressional position: 
solely for the purposes of the insider trading prohibitions arising under 
this Act ... each Member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a 
                                                                                                                         
15 E.g., H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006). 
16 Brody Mullins et al., Congress Staffers Gain from Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 11, 2010), at A1; Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?, 60 MINUTES 
(Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388130n. 
17 Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address, 
“An America Built to Last” (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.cspan.org/uploadedFiles/Content 
/The_Administration/State_of_the_Union/SOTU-2012.pdf. 
18 Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Law Makers Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2012, at A13. 
19 Compare Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), 
Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 §5 (2012) with S. 1903, 112th Cong. §5 (2011). 
20 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 
112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).  
21 Id. § 4(a). 
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duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, 
the United States Government, and the citizens of the United States with 
respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such person’s 
position as a Member of Congress or employee of Congress or gained 
from the performance of such person’s official responsibilities.22 
  But the Act does not hash out specific rules for what sort of infor-
mation is subject to this duty, or otherwise clarify the relation to insider 
trading. Instead, it leaves this to each chamber’s ethics committees, stating 
that the respective ethics committee of each House shall issue interpretive 
guidelines of the relevant rules.23 
The Act also directs the Office of Government Ethics and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to adopt clarifying rules concerning trad-
ing on material, nonpublic information by members and employees of the 
executive and judicial branches, respectively.24 
An earlier version of the Act contained language that was both broader 
and more specific. It directed the SEC, not the Ethics Committees of each 
chamber, to adopt prophylactic rules prohibiting  
any person from buying or selling the securities of any issuer while such 
person is in possession of material nonpublic information, as defined 
by the [SEC], relating to any pending or prospective legislation action 
relating to such issuer if (1) such information was obtained by reason 
of such person being a Member or employee of Congress; or (2) such in-
formation was obtained from a Member or employee of Congress, and 
such person knows that the information was so obtained.25 
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Temporarily leaving aside the question of what it could mean for some-
thing to be confidential for only one specific purpose, the first ambiguity of 
the operative language is the reference to “the insider trading prohibitions 
arising under the” ’34 Act. The ’34 Act never refers to “insider trading” per 
se, except in the titles to section 20A—Liability to Contemporaneous Traders 
of Insider Trading26—and section 21A—Civil Penalties for Insider Trading.27 
As their titles suggest, section 20A allows contemporaneous traders to bring 
private causes of action against insider traders and section 21A allows the 
                                                                                                                         
22 Id. § 4(b) (emphasis added). 
23 Id. § 3.  
24 Id. § 9(a). 
25 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 305 
(2011) (quoting H.R. 682, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009)). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006). 
27 Id. § 78u-1. 
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SEC to bring civil actions against insider traders. Only section 21A, relating 
to SEC civil actions, is amended by the STOCK Act, implying that con-
temporaneous traders will have no private right of action against members of 
Congress or their staffers. 
Sections 20A and 21A impose liability to those who violate “any provi-
sion of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or sell-
ing a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information ….”28 
Unfortunately, neither of these sections,29 nor any other provision of the ’34 
Act, deigns to give any hint as to when trading in securities violates the Act 
in a context other than tender offers, which are subject to the prophylactic 
prohibitions of Rule 14e-3.30 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that, 
in order to be unlawful, trading must fall under the catchall provisions of 
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act, which only prohibits  actual fraud.31 
The language of the STOCK Act’s provision giving members of Con-
gress and their staffers a “duty of trust and confidence” alludes (albeit, im-
perfectly) to the language of Rule 10b5-232 promulgated by the SEC under 
                                                                                                                         
28 Id. § 78t-1. The parallel language of section 21A is virtually identical, differing only 
in that it also refers to trading in security-based swaps. Section 21A also covers tipping, 
here similarly cryptically described as a violation of “any such provision by communi-
cating such information in connection with, a transaction on or through the facilities of a 
national securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer ....” Id. § 78u-1. 
29 Earlier versions of these statutory provisions did contain definitions of insider trading 
but they were omitted in the final acts because 
the court-drawn parameters of insider trading have established clear 
guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider trading cases, and ... a 
statutory definition could potentially be narrowing, and in an unintended 
manner facilitate schemes to evade the law. 
H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCE-
MENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 100-9010, at 11 (2d Sess. 1988) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6063. See also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and 
the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1368 (2009) [hereinafter 
Nagy, Fiduciary Principles]. As will be discussed throughout this Article, in fact the con-
tours of the misappropriation theory of insider trading are as clear as mud. 
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014). 
31 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Consequently, Stephen Bainbridge 
correctly refers to the incoherence of insider-trading law as the “Santa Fe problem.” 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW INSIDER TRADING 65 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter, 
BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING]. As I will discuss, both classic-insider and misappropriation-
outsider trading law, as developed in fact, prohibit self-dealing by disloyal agents in the 
intellectual property of their principals. See Sullivan, supra note 14; see also infra note 72 
and accompanying text. However, Santa Fe holds that breaches of fiduciary duties per se 
are not violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Consequently, the Supreme Court re-
quires judges to pretend that it is the trader’s lies (non-disclosure) to the source of infor-
mation that is the harm, rather than the trading itself. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING, 
supra at 65. 
32 SEC Rules Relating to Debt Collection, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). 
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section 10b(5), in an attempt to restrain judicially imposed limitations on 
insider-trading liability. Unfortunately, as I shall discuss, the legal status of 
this regulation is uncertain because its language is arguably broader than that 
adopted by the Supreme Court.33 
It is not clear that this provision will significantly clarify when congres-
sional trading is unlawful. Consequently, with respect to congressional trad-
ing, it is another provision that may be more important as a practical matter. 
Section 6 will require members and staff to publicly report all trading in pub-
licly issued securities within forty-five days.34 This might have some sham-
ing effect that will discourage them from trading in corporations that would 
be affected by pending legislation or where there seems to otherwise be bla-
tant conflicts of interest. Or to put this more gently, it might increase aware-
ness that some securities trading by public officials, whether or not unlawful, 
is widely considered to be unseemly. 
B. The Theory of Insider Trading 
1. The Insider-Trading Puzzle 
Ignorance about insider-trading law is rife among not only lay people, but 
also attorneys who do not practice securities law. The lack of any express 
statutory or regulatory definition for what constitutes insider trading—other 
than for the limited case of tender offers—makes the law unclear. Additionally, 
most purchases and sales of property—even of securities—based on non-
public information—are perfectly legal. With a little thought, one should real-
ize that this must be the case. In the immortal words of R. Foster Winans, 
the primary defendant in the seminal misappropriation case of Carpenter v. 
United States: “The only reason to invest in the market is because you think 
you know something others don’t.”35 That is, one does not have to be a doc-
trinaire adherent in the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis36 to understand 
that if you are buying stock because you think that its price is going up, or 
you are selling because you think it is going down, you must believe that you 
know something that the market does not. Otherwise this information would 
already be embedded in the stock price. Indeed, the entire securities-analysis 
                                                                                                                         
33 See infra Part I.B. 
34 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 
112-105, § 6, 126 Stat. 291, 293–94 (2012). 
35 Thoughts on the Business of Life, FORBES.COM, http://thoughts.forbes.com/thoughts 
/r-foster-winans (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 
19 (1987). 
36 For the classic statement of the ECMH, see Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
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business is based on trying to discover, develop, and sell information ahead 
of the market. 
But more importantly, rather than adopting a parity-of-information re-
gime, our society usually permits people to exploit informational asymmetries 
when purchasing and selling assets.37 Indeed, informational advantages are 
typically protected as trade secrets, and are often analyzed as a form of 
intellectual property.38 As we shall see, the U.S. Supreme Court has based 
its misappropriation theory of unlawful trading precisely upon just such a 
property analysis.39 
For example, in the early insider-trading case of SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, initial testing indicated that a publicly traded company may have 
made an extremely rich mineral strike on property it owned in Canada.40 
Texas Gulf Sulphur tried to keep this material information secret for as long 
as practical while further testing was done, so that it could buy contiguous 
real estate from its ignorant neighbors at an attractive price.41 As the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, this was perfectly “legitimate” under 
the common law principles that underlie Canadian and American law.42 
And yet, the Second Circuit held that it would be unlawful insider 
trading for officers and directors of the Company to purchase shares of the 
Company’s stock during the time that the material information remained a 
                                                                                                                         
37 This is why James Boyle suggests that insider trading is a “puzzle.” James Boyle, A 
Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (1992). 
38 As Henry G. Manne states rather sharply, but accurately: “Lawyers especially, it 
would seem, should be very circumspect about characterizing the utilization of superior 
information as immoral. That is, after all, their stock in trade.” Henry G. Manne, Insider 
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 551 (1970). 
Although in Carpenter the Supreme Court seemed to think that the analysis of infor-
mation as property was unproblematic, in fact, as I have discussed elsewhere, its proper 
characterization is highly contested. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: 
Hegel’s Theory of Personality and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453 (2006) 
(republished as Unnatural Rights: Hegel’s Theory of Personality and Intellectual Property, 
in COPYRIGHT (Christopher Yoo ed., EDWARD ELGAR PRESS 2011) [hereinafter Schroed-
er, Unnatural Rights]). Accordingly, Vincent Chiappetta asks rhetorically: 
Is trade secret law a chameleon with the ability to appear varyingly as an 
almost full-fledged property right, a quasi-property right or a duty of con-
fidence depending on its environment? Or perhaps nothing is actually 
there but a powerful legal myth? 
Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative 
Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 70 (1999). 
39 See Carpenter, 50 U.S. at 25–26. 
40 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
41 Id. at 843–44. 
42 Id. at 848. 
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secret.43 Why the difference? Why indeed do we find, in James Boyle’s 
words, this “island of egalitarianism at the very heart of capitalism”?44 
2. The Harm to Be Prevented 
Another reason for confusion about unlawful insider and outsider trading 
is that, although there is a widespread intuition that it is wrong—at least some 
of the time—there is little consensus within the securities bar and academia 
as to just what is wrong with it. A recent empirical study by Stuart Green and 
Matthew Kugler suggested a similar confusion among lay people.45 They do 
not like insider trading, even though they, typically, do not really know what 
it is or why they do not like it.46 
In a recent article, Samuel Buell accuses the courts of “duck[ing] the ques-
tion of its purpose within the scheme of securities regulation” of Rule 10b-5 
generally and resorting to “bromides;”47 a harsh, yet justified, assessment. 
I am one of many who have trod this ground before, so I will be brief.48 
To simplify, proponents of bans on insider trading tend to speak in terms of 
fairness. The title of an early article by Kim Lane Sheppele probably best 
captures the lay intuition about insider trading—It’s Just Not Right.49 A 
fairness rationale for what has become the abstain-or-foreclose rule was 
initially adopted by the SEC in the early administrative action of Cady, 
Roberts & Co.50 The Second Circuit adopted a similar rationale in Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, finding a “justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace 
                                                                                                                         
43 Id. at 849. The Supreme Court subsequently rejected the fairness and parity-of-
information rationales of Texas Gulf Sulphur in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222 (1980). 
44 Boyle, supra note 37, at 1491. 
45 Matthew P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When is it Wrong to Trade Stocks on the 
Basis of Inside Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 445, 484 (2011). 
46 Id. 
47 Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L. J. 511, 572, 568 (2011). 
48 For example, Bainbridge, writing in 1995, identifies three rationales in the academic 
literature. First, it supplements the mandatory disclosure system. Second, it protects inves-
tors. Third, it provides confidence in the markets. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating 
State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1189, 1234–42 (1995). The second of Bainbridge’s rationales is similar to what 
I call fairness, and the third to what I call market integrity. I am in basic agreement with 
Bainbridge’s dismissal of the fairness and market integrity rationales, but I am more sym-
pathetic with the first. Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12. 
49 Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993). 
50 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
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that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal ac-
cess to material information.”51 
One problem with this approach is that American law does not generally 
impose a parity-of-information type fairness standard in markets generally. 
Consequently, in Chiarella v. United States, the majority of the Supreme 
Court rejected the parity-of-information policy that underlaid the fairness 
rationale for insider trading.52 The Court held that mere possession of ma-
terial, nonpublic information does not impose limitations on trading absent 
a fiduciary-type relationship with the source of the information: 
First, not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent 
activity under § 10(b). Second, the element required to make silence 
fraudulent—a duty to disclose—is absent in this case. No duty could arise 
from petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of the target company’s 
securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their 
agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who 
dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.53 
This line of reasoning was expanded in Dirks v. SEC, in which the Su-
preme Court held that mere possession of nonpublic information did not 
impose a duty on a tippee not to trade in securities.54 Rather, a tippee’s lia-
bility was held to be derivative of that of his tipper, which, in turn, required 
that the tipper violated a fiduciary duty to the source of the information. As 
the Court explained: 
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpo-
ration not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the in-
sider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing 
                                                                                                                         
51 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit 
stated that it was “the Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to 
the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all 
members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks....” Id. at 851–52. 
52 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). Although the Supreme Court did 
not deny that section 10(b) is rooted in a conception of fairness, it insisted that “not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b).” Id. at 232. 
53 Id. at 232–33 (citations omitted). 
54 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983). That is, 
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders [but the] basis for 
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired 
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into 
a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the en-
terprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. 
Id. at 655 n. 14; see also id. at 657–58. 
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the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that 
there has been a breach.55 
In contrast, critics who question the wisdom or efficacy of limits on 
insider trading tend to speak in terms of market efficiency.56 In this view, 
permitting insiders to trade would incentivize the dissemination of infor-
mation to the market. 
Justice Ginsburg in United States v. O’Hagan—the case in which the 
Supreme Court first embraced the misappropriation theory of insider trad-
ing—asserts that both the classic and misappropriation theories of fraud serve 
the slightly different goals of market integrity and investor protection.57 This 
market-integrity justification has both a fairness and efficiency component. 
In O’Hagan, Justice Ginsburg states: 
Although informational disparity is inevitable in securities markets, in-
vestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where 
trading on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. 
An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-à-vis a misappropriator 
with material, nonpublic information stems from a contrivance, not luck; 
it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.58 
That is, if investors believed that the market was rigged (that is, unfair) 
they would flee the market, thus making it less efficient. One commentator 
has recently gone so far as to suggest that if insider trading were legalized, 
“[s]tock markets would drastically shrink if not disappear.”59 Both these 
views seem to implicitly presume that the goal of investing in the securi-
ties market is to make a quick profit by beating the market prior to sudden 
changes in prices, rather than long-term growth. 
Notoriously, one of the problems of all of these approaches goes beyond 
the fact that the ’34 Act does not define insider trading. Although strong 
arguments have been made that the regulatory scheme of the two primary 
                                                                                                                         
55 Id. at 660. In addition, the tipper must have an improper purpose for breaching his 
duty to his source. The “insider [must] personally ... benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. 
And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.” Id. at 662. 
56 The efficiency argument for permitting insider trading was kicked off by Henry G. 
Manne in his book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966). See Manne, supra note 
38. For a quick survey of the economic arguments for and against limits on insider trading, 
see Barbabella et al., supra note 4, at 227–35. 
57 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). 
58 Id. at 658–59. 
59 George W. Dent, Jr., Why Legalized Insider Trading Would Be a Disaster 1 (Case 
Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 2012-36, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169975. 
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securities acts should serve the broad purposes of fairness, efficiency, and 
market integrity, no operative provision of either act speaks directly to such 
goals. Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that if they are to be un-
lawful, insider and outsider trading must fall within the basket clause of 
section 10(b)(5) of the ’34 Act, which proscribes “any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance.”60 Moreover, since the retrenchment cases of the 
mid-1970’s, the Court has insisted that securities fraud is not constructive 
fraud, but actual fraud—the tort of deception.61 
It has not been clear how to fit the square pegs of fairness, efficiency, 
and market integrity into the round hole of actual fraud.62 Regardless of 
whether all fraudulent acts are unfair, not all unfair acts are fraudulent. If 
efficiency is defined, as it frequently is in legal academia, in terms of max-
imization of some appropriate desideratum such as utility, productivity, or 
wealth, then it is possible that some non-fraudulent acts might be ineffi-
cient and some fraudulent acts might be efficient. Further, many, including 
myself, are suspicious of the unsupported empirical assertion that a ban on 
insider trading is necessary for the sake of market integrity on the grounds 
that otherwise investors would flee the market.63 If anything, the meager evi-
dence can be read as an indication of the widespread suspicion that insider 
trading often occurs has had little effect on market participation.64  
                                                                                                                         
60 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2013). 
61 521 U.S. at 654. This is exacerbated by the fact that, because the Supreme Court has 
approached securities fraud generally, and insider trading specifically, in a classic, common 
law, piecemeal manner, it has never given a single, clear statement of all of the elements 
of a cause of action. Id. 
62 In the words of Donald C. Langevoort, the 
confusion in how we define unlawful insider trading [results from] the 
quixotic effort to build a coherent theory of insider trading by reference to 
the law of fraud, rather than a more expansive market abuse standard.... 
That is intellectually awkward because there is relatively little about 
unlawful insider trading that can fairly be considered deceptive, yet de-
ception is the essence of fraud. The result is a crazy-quilt of made-up 
doctrinal innovations .... 
Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Require-
ment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 2 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2012). 
63 Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2068. 
64 To give the devil his due, Henry G. Manne argues that there is an easy way to test 
which side is correct in the case of classic insider trading. That is, we could allow a publicly 
traded company to give its management and employees permission to engage in classic 
insider trading so long as the company publicly disclosed this policy. If investors react by 
dumping the stock of companies that do so, we have evidence that the net effect of allowing 
such trading does hurt market confidence, and that Congress should consider banning this 
practice. If investors do not dump the stock, it would suggest that the current ban is un-
necessary and perhaps inefficient. See generally Manne, supra note 38. 
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Finally, the policies that insider-trading law are supposed to address 
are different from the concerns that led to the STOCK Act. I will return to 
this divergence. 
3. Intellectual Property 
Both Stephen Bainbridge and I argue that, although the courts ostensibly 
speak of fraud and integrity, insider-trading law, as actually applied, is based 
on the allocation of property rights in nonpublic information (for example, 
trade secrets).65 Both the classic and misappropriation theories analyze in-
sider trading as a form of self-dealing in a principal’s property by a disloyal 
agent,66 suggesting that restrictions on trading should be limited to persons 
who have a fiduciary-type duty to the source of the information.67 Although 
this is implicit in the jurisprudence of classic insider trading, the Supreme 
Court has made this express in the case of misappropriation (as the termi-
nology makes clear). Justice Ginsburg states in O’Hagan: 
A company’s confidential information ... qualifies as property to which 
the company has a right of exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropri-
ation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, ... constitutes 
fraud akin to embezzlement—“the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own 
use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”68 
                                                                                                                         
65 See Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2027. Writing in 1995, before O’Hagan, 
Steven Bainbridge wrote:  
If one accepts protection of property rights as the rationale for regulating 
insider trading, it becomes quite difficult to discern any compelling fed-
eral interest in doing so. The property rights rationale makes it obvious 
that the federal insider trading prohibition has nothing to do with dis-
closure or fraud. Instead, like the trade secrets rules, the insider trading 
prohibition is mainly concerned with preventing employees and other 
fiduciaries from using information belonging to the corporation for per-
sonal gain. As such, the prohibition is unrelated to the traditional purposes 
of the securities laws. Indeed, the prohibition is arguably inconsistent 
with the federalism policies of those laws. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1257 (1995).  
66 As stated in the Restatement of Agency: 
An agent has a duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in 
connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of 
the principal or otherwise through the agent’s use of the agent’s position. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).  
67 As discussed below (see infra notes 79–81), the extent to which insider trading lia-
bility is or should be restrained by a fiduciary requirement has become controversial. 
68 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (citations omitted) (citing Carpenter 
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987) (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902))). 
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When an owner entrusts property to an agent, the agent has a duty not to 
take and use the property for his own purposes.69 Ginsburg concluded from 
this that, if the agent intends to self-deal in the property, he has a duty to tell 
his source—the property owner. Not to do so is fraud in that the unfaithful 
confidant has “feign[ed] fidelity.”70 The use of proprietary information is a 
misappropriation, because it deprives the source of its exclusive use of the 
information—which is the definition of possession of information.71 
This means that, under this theory, it is not enough that a source gives 
information to a confidant; the source must have some proprietary right in the 
information.72 Consequently, given that property is traditionally the bailiwick 
                                                                                                                         
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006). 
70 521 U.S. at 655. 
71 521 U.S. at 652, 654. 
72 To date, the courts have held that violation of property rights in information is a nec-
essary, but not sufficient, element of insider trading. Consequently, in SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 
1263 (11th Cir. 2003), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the SEC’s 
contention that the misappropriation theory was grounded solely on the protection of 
property rights: 
To the extent that the securities laws are premised upon a property rights 
doctrine, we agree that unauthorized disclosure that harms the principal 
constitutes a breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality. However, the 
securities laws are not based on property rights alone. An “animating 
purpose” of the Exchange Act is to “[e]nsure honest securities markets and 
thereby promote investor confidence.” For this reason, trading on material, 
nonpublic information (not just possessing, disclosing, or stealing) is 
essential to incur insider trading liability. Judge Winter ... has advocated 
a property rights approach to insider trading laws. While his views make 
practical sense, we cannot ignore the fact that insider trading prohibi-
tions, in the end, must be premised on fraud. 
Id. at 1277 n.31 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 
(1997) (citing Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (Sept. 12, 1980) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240))). The Court continued: 
Judge Winter’s statement ... that the misappropriation theory’s purpose 
“is to protect property rights in information”—is therefore incomplete 
in that it ignores the fact that the theory’s essential purpose must be the 
prevention of fraud. 
Id. at 1277 n.31 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 
(1997), for the proposition that “the misappropriation theory is consistent with § 10(b) 
because it involves ‘manipulation or deception’”). 
Similarly, in SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (S.D.N.Y.2010), one of the 
reasons the Southern District of New York found for the defendants in a bench trial was 
because the SEC did not establish fraud: 
[D]eceit—or the unauthorized theft of confidential information—is the 
cornerstone of the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, on 
which the SEC’s case relies. The SEC has not established that there was 
any deception in this case. Mr. Rorech disclosed to his supervisors on the 
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of state law, Bainbridge argues that the “prohibition’s location in the federal 
securities laws [is] a historical accident ....”73 Consequently, he has, rather 
refreshingly, called for the federal courts to recognize that insider-trading 
law does not involve fraud at all; rather, it involves a federal common-law 
intellectual-property right.74 Fully recognizing the many jurisprudential prob-
lems involved in, among other things, the creation of a de facto federal 
common-law crime,75 Bainbridge argues that the current civil law regime 
may have some continuing justification because the SEC has developed a 
comparative advantage in detecting and prosecuting violations of such 
rights in the securities markets.76 
I agree with Bainbridge that the law is likely to remain hopelessly inco-
herent if the courts continue to justify its de facto property regime through 
the rhetoric of deception. I, however, diverge from him on many grounds. 
Most importantly, although it is often asserted that the classic and misap-
propriation theories of unlawful trading are complementary,77 in fact they 
                                                                                                                         
sales desk and in capital markets that he was, in fact, sharing information 
about the potential holding company issuance with his customers, in-
cluding Mr. Negrin’s hedge fund, Millennium. Mr. Rorech was never 
told to stop sharing such information nor cautioned as to its allegedly 
confidential nature. 
Id. at 373 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–55 (1997)). 
73 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice 
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1644 (1999) 
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Path Dependent]. 
74 “The Court should again explicitly acknowledge that it is making common law. The 
rules it announces should be based on the protection of property rights, not on inapt secu-
rities fraud concepts.” Id. at 1651. 
75 In Thomas Hazen’s words: 
Though federal securities law is statutory in nature (and thus technically 
speaking has not been derived by courts as a matter of common law), the 
law of insider trading has an essentially common-law character. This is 
because the law is not spelled out with particularity in the statute or SEC 
rules, but rather is found in the case law. Accordingly, insider and out-
sider trading law has developed through courts adapting insider trading 
prohibitions to section 10(b)’s and Rule 10b-5’s broadly worded fraud 
and deception limitations, much in the same manner as common law 
evolves—i.e., on a case-by-case basis. 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Non-
public Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 889–90 (2010) [hereinafter Hazen, Outsider 
Trading]. Like me, Hazen “suggests that a statutory definition of prohibited insider and out-
sider trading is long overdue” because judges have had to “muddle through the tortuous 
path” of the case law and have resulted in “decisions [that] are confusing and inconsistent 
with one another.” Id. at 883, 887, 889. 
76 Bainbridge, Path Dependent, supra note 73, at 1591. 
77 This was Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
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are irreconcilable. They are based on competing views as to who owns non-
public information. Moreover, the property regime reflected in the misap-
propriation theory is antithetical to the policy behind the securities laws. 
As I have argued elsewhere,78 the classic theory implicitly holds that 
certain information about publicly traded corporations belongs not merely to 
the issuer, but by extension, to the existing and potential shareholders of that 
corporation—that is, the trading public.79 A classic insider who has fidu-
ciary duties to the issuer cannot, therefore, deal in this “property” for personal 
benefit without first disclosing the information to the trading public, the im-
puted “owners” of the information. Because the insider does not have the 
right to make such a disclosure, this so-called disclose-or-abstain rule is, in 
fact, an abstain rule.80 The problems with this theory are legion and well-
known and shall not be rehashed again here.81 Nevertheless the classic 
                                                                                                                         
78 Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2067–69. 
79 If classic insider trading law is really based on state fiduciary duty law, then it should 
only prohibit insiders from buying and selling equity stock from or to existing shareholders, 
but should not prohibit selling stock to potential shareholders. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court noted in Chiarella that “it would be a sorry distinction to allow [the insider] to use 
the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although 
he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 
49 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951)). I am not the first one to conclude 
that this illustrates the incoherence of the Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence. 
See, e.g., Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 29, at 1118. 
80 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently noted, “if disclosure is 
impracticable or prohibited by business considerations or by law, the duty is to abstain from 
trading.” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Teicher, 
987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
81 A few examples of problems with the classic theory, besides the issue of assuming a 
fiduciary duty to non-shareholders in open-market transactions, are in order. First, it is not 
at all clear that it is a correct interpretation of the fiduciary duties of traditional insiders, 
which is ordinarily considered the bailiwick of state corporate law (which is one reason why 
Bainbridge believes that it should be considered federal common law). See Bainbridge, 
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 9, at 1192. Second, if the problem is that the traditional in-
sider is self-dealing, should not trading be permitted if the insider makes full disclosure of 
his intent to trade to the Board of Directors and obtains the consent of the disinterested 
directors? After all, this is the rule that applies when an insider wishes to exploit a corporate 
opportunity. Third, the classic theory is arguably limited to trading in equity securities, be-
cause it is black-letter law that corporations and their insiders only have fiduciary duties 
to shareholders and mere contract duty to debt holders. But concerns as to market integrity 
and efficiency would seem to be identical for the markets of debt and equity. Fourth, for al-
most every “innocent” shareholder who is “injured” by insider trading by, for example, buy-
ing shares at “too high” a price immediately before a drop when information is disclosed, 
there will always be another equally “innocent” shareholder who has benefitted by selling 
high. Indeed, it is not clear how the former shareholder had been injured since she intended 
to purchase the shares at a time when she was not yet entitled to the nonpublic information. 
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theory has resulted in fairly clear guidelines applicable to a limited and easily 
identifiable class of persons. 
The misappropriation theory, in contrast, holds that the nonpublic infor-
mation belongs to the source and need not be shared with the public.82 The 
source, as owner of the information, is free to exploit it for its own financial 
benefit as the source deems fit, including using it to trade in securities. In con-
trast, a person, who has fiduciary duties to the source, may not deal in the 
source’s “property” for his own purposes, including trading in securities, 
unless he first makes disclosure of her intent to the source. 
I believe that the misappropriation theory’s allocation of property rights 
in information is at best not relevant to, and in some cases inconsistent with, 
the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws. As such, it 
should be left to the state law of trade secrets. Indeed, Bainbridge admits 
that his analysis “implicates all sorts of issues of institutional competence, 
statutory interpretation, federalism, and the like ....”83 Moreover, even if 
the courts were to adopt a federal common law protecting proprietary inter-
ests in information, there is no justification for limiting this protection to its 
use in the purchase and sale of securities, as opposed to all self-dealing. 
In any event, the wisdom of the current insider trading regime with re-
spect to non-congressional actors is beyond the scope of this Article. There 
seems to be widespread revulsion among the public over the idea of “insider” 
trading, despite an inchoate conception as to what the phrase might mean.84 
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that Congress, the SEC, or the courts 
would significantly change the law to permit more insider trading merely 
because of criticism by academics like myself. As I shall discuss later, how-
ever, this property analysis will bring into question whether the STOCK Act 
will effectively restrict congressional trading.85 Arguably, this shows the in-
adequacy of the property analysis and demonstrates yet another reason why 
Congress should amend the securities laws to add a definition aimed directly 
at the goals that restrictions on insider trading are supposed to accomplish, 
whether conceived in terms of fairness, efficiency, market integrity, or some-
thing else. 
                                                                                                                         
A final problem is more directly related to this Article, namely that the classic theory 
does not implicate a lot of trading that the public finds equally problematic—such as trading 
in securities of a potential target based on nonpublic information obtained from a potential 
bidder. This, of course, is the situation in O’Hagan, in which the Supreme Court adopted 
the misappropriation theory. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642–43. 
82 I set forth this argument in full in Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2073–75. 
83 See Bainbridge, Path Dependent, supra note 73, at 1650. 
84 See Hazen, Outsider Trading, supra note 75, at 883–84. 
85 See infra notes 128, 286 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Law of Insider Trading 
1. Fraud 
To reiterate, because there is no statutory or regulatory definition other 
than in the context of a tender offer,86 the purchase and sale of securities on 
the basis of material nonpublic information can only be unlawful if it falls 
within the ’34 Act’s catchall prohibition of section 10(b), which proscribes 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security … any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of the rules of the 
SEC.87 The SEC has adopted several rules under this provision, most im-
portantly Rule 10b-5, which reads in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly [to use the juris-
dictional means]: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.88 
For the past 35 years—since its opinion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green89—the Supreme Court has emphasized that section 10(b) encom-
passes only actual, not constructive, fraud, and that fraud requires decep-
tion.90 Consequently, in its three insider-trading cases, the Court has reiterated 
that Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 10(b), can prohibit only de-
ceitful activities.91 
                                                                                                                         
86 As mentioned in passing, Rule 14e-3 is a broad rule prohibiting trading by certain 
persons on the basis of material nonpublic information after someone has taken significant 
steps towards the commencement of a tender offer. See supra note 33 and accompanying 
text. As its numeration indicates, this Rule was not promulgated under section 10(b) of the 
’34 Act, but under section 14(e)(3), which gives the SEC the authority to “prescribe means 
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative….” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(2)(D) (West 2013). In O’Hagan, the majority of the 
Supreme Court found that this broad language of 14(e) gave the SEC powers to adopt 
prophylactic rules in connection with tender offers. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 666–77 (1997). 
87 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2013). 
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
89 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–80 (1977).  
90 521 U.S. at 651–52.  
91 “Liability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct 
encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.” Id. at 651. “Section 10 (b) is aptly described as a 
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This creates at least two major problems in applying section 10(b) to in-
sider trading. First, as already discussed, those who wish to prohibit some 
form of insider trading want to do so not because they believe it is fraudulent. 
Consequently, there is an inevitable disconnect between judicial interpreta-
tion of what the law in fact bans and what the public (and the SEC) would 
like it to ban. Second, in what way could trading on the basis of material, non-
public information be fraudulent? Fraud is a complex intentional tort of 
many elements. What interests us at this stage is that to allege fraud, it is 
not enough that the defendant cheated or treated someone unfairly. 
2. The Duty to Speak 
Fraud requires, among other things, that the fraudster lied to someone.92 
This concept is relatively straightforward when someone makes an affirma-
tive misstatement to a victim. It becomes more difficult when he is silent, as 
in the case of insider trading. That is, to state the obvious, insider (and out-
sider) trading concerns the trading of securities by a person having infor-
mation that he has not disclosed to the trading public. When does silence 
become fraudulent speech? 
It is black-letter law that absent a legal duty to speak, silence is not 
fraudulent.93 It is also black-letter law that the securities laws do not man-
date parity of information, so mere possession of material information in 
and of itself does not give a person a duty to speak.94 
There are, of course, legal exceptions to “silence is golden.” For exam-
ple, the securities laws give issuers of publicly traded securities some very 
specific duties to speak at specific times—such as the requirement that they 
file annual reports on Form 10-K within a certain number of days after the 
end of their fiscal years.95 Insider trading occurs, however, at a time when 
there is no such clear statutory duty under the securities laws. 
The final question we shall consider is that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
are not a sweeping federal law of fraud generally, but of only fraud “in 
                                                                                                                         
catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 234–35 (1980). 
92 Other elements of securities fraud include the fraudster acted with scienter, the lie con-
cerned a material fact, and the fraud caused harm to the plaintiff. The element of reliance 
is necessary as part of a showing of “transaction” causation (roughly equivalent to but-for 
causation). In addition, the plaintiff must show “loss” causation, which is roughly equivalent 
to proximate causation. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 157, 165–68, 171 (2008). 
93 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2013). 
94 Id. See also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 600, 
619, 625 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
95 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (West 2013). 
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connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”96 To understand 
why this is problematic, we must first explain the two different theories of 
insider trading. 
The duty to speak under both theories seems to be based on the so-
called special-facts doctrine, imported from fiduciary duty law. Sometimes 
a trustee has an affirmative duty to make disclosures to her beneficiaries 
prior to dealing with the corpus of the trust for the trustee’s own behalf. As 
both Bainbridge and I have argued, the special-facts doctrine, in fact, has 
less to do with fraud than with self-dealing—an agent’s unauthorized use of 
her principal’s property.97 
I say that the theories “seem to be based” on this doctrine because the 
courts are remarkably reticent in explaining their underlying theories. Once 
again, I, among others, have told this story extensively elsewhere, so I will 
only give a brief rundown of those issues directly relevant to my analysis.98 
a. Classic Insider Trading 
Because the STOCK Act implicitly invokes the misappropriation theory, 
I will only mention the classic theory in passing. Classic insider trading oc-
curs when a traditional insider of a publicly traded company—such as an of-
ficer, director, employee, or controlling shareholder—purchases or sells the 
equity securities of that company on the basis of material nonpublic, and 
firm-specific information about that company obtained through her position 
with the company. Although the courts rarely state their reasoning expressly, 
the intuition seems to be that under state law: (i) a traditional insider owes a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to her corporation and, indirectly, its shareholders, 
(ii) a fiduciary may not deal in the property of her beneficiary for her open 
personal benefit, and (iii) material nonpublic information about that corpo-
ration can be thought of as corporate property; and, therefore, the insider has 
a duty to speak to the shareholders before using this information on her 
own behalf. This is the so-called disclose-or-abstain rule.99 
                                                                                                                         
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
97 I have compared the classic theory of insider trading to the rule that insiders of a 
corporation may not take a “corporate opportunity” for personal gain. Schroeder, Envy, 
supra note 12, at 2053, 2070. 
98 See Hazen, Outsider Trading, supra note 75. 
99 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–28 (1980). In fact, the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of state law does not seem accurate. For example, while an officer or 
director of a corporation may have a fiduciary duty to its shareholders, a mere employee 
would only have a duty to the corporation itself. Moreover, under state law, management’s 
fiduciary duty would only run to current, but not potential, shareholders, suggesting that 
only purchases, but not sales, of securities should run afoul of the law. See supra note 81 
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This rule has been extended to so-called temporary insiders as well. 
These are people who, although not traditional insiders, such as officers of 
the company, nevertheless have a fiduciary-type duty of confidentiality to the 
issuer. The most obvious example would be the company’s outside coun-
sel, who has a duty of confidentiality by virtue of the code of professional 
responsibility.100 I shall not discuss here what other relationships create such 
a duty because this issue has largely been subsumed under the misappro-
priation theory as a practical matter. 
b. Misappropriation 
Because the classic theory, as set forth in Chiarella and Dirks, does not 
cover many transactions that seem intuitively to be equally unseemly, the 
SEC and DOJ sought to develop an alternate theory of unlawful trading.101 
In United States v. Carpenter, the Second Circuit adopted what has come 
to be called the misappropriation theory.102 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
upheld the misappropriation theory as a basis for a wire fraud prosecution, 
but split 4–4 on whether it could also form the basis for a securities fraud 
prosecution.103 Consequently, although the Second Circuit’s decision up-
holding the conviction for securities fraud stood, the law remained unclear 
nationally for another decade until United States v. O’Hagan in 1997.104 
The facts of O’Hagan on first blush seem to illustrate precisely why a 
new theory was necessary. The Supreme Court’s analysis, however, is un-
fortunate. It is not based on the securities law principle of public disclosure, 
but on the antithetical intellectual property law principles of exclusivity and 
secrecy. It supports convicting a defendant of securities fraud even when 
there is no victim of securities fraud.105 It is also amorphous, lacking clear 
boundaries. Unfortunately, the language of the STOCK Act tracks the 
SEC’s attempt to broaden the rule of O’Hagan. As such, it is still not clear 
how to apply it to congressional trading. 
                                                                                                                         
and infra note 100. Finally, the duty to speak would run to the corporation and not directly 
to the shareholders. 445 U.S. at 222–23. 
100 “The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent 
insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who 
temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
652 (1997); Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2056–57. 
101 The SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 to deal with the specific fact pattern in Chiarella, 
namely trading by a non-insider in securities of an entity involved in a tender offer. See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014); 455 U.S. at 222–23. 
102 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026–29 (2d Cir. 1986). 
103 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
104 521 U.S. at 676–78 (1997). 
105 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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James O’Hagan, a partner in a law firm, learned that one of its clients, 
Grand Met, intended to launch a hostile takeover of Pillsbury. Based on this 
information, he bought call options in the target and made a quick $4.3 mil-
lion profit.106 (If this unethical behavior by an attorney is not appalling 
enough, the reason why he needed the money was to surreptitiously pay back 
money he embezzled as a trustee for another client.107) Even though O’Hagan 
clearly purchased and sold securities on the basis of material nonpublic in-
formation, he could not be prosecuted under the classic theory because the 
source of the information was not the issuer of the securities traded. That is, 
with respect to Pillsbury, O’Hagan was an outsider, not an insider. 
Someone who is not a securities lawyer might be shocked that we could 
not prosecute O’Hagan for insider trading and demand that the law be 
changed. The lawyer’s reply, however, is that of course we could do so prior 
to O’Hagan—but not under Rule 10b-5. He was clearly in violation of 
Rule 14e-3—which was promulgated to overrule Chiarella—because a sub-
stantial step had been taken by his client towards the commencement of a 
tender offer. In O’Hagan the majority of the Supreme Court affirmed that 
unlike section 10(b), which is limited to actual fraud, the broad language of 
14(e) gives the SEC authority to promulgate prophylactic rules with respect 
to tender offers.108 Consequently, by indicting O’Hagan under Rule 10b-5 
in addition to Rule 14e-3, the DOJ was trying to increase his punishment. 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that a violation of a fiduciary-
type duty of confidentiality can constitute fraud for the purposes of the fed-
eral wire fraud statute, which prohibits the “obtaining [of] money or property 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, 
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication ....”109 The theory is that when one enters into a fiduciary-
type relationship of confidentiality with a person, one makes an implied (or 
often express) representation that one will keep the confidence and will not 
use the information for one’s own benefit. If one, in fact, intends to do so, 
one is lying through silence. That is, once one is deemed to have made this 
implied representation, one acquires an affirmative duty to speak and inform 
the source of one’s intention to break the confidence. Omitting to speak can 
be a fraud. Finally, the Supreme Court held that confidential information 
is property.110 This means that when a disloyal confidant uses confidential 
                                                                                                                         
106 521 U.S. at 647–48. 
107 Richard D. Hylton, S.E.C. Cites Lawyer Over Grand Met, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 
1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/11/business/sec-cites-lawyer-over-grand-met.html. 
108 521 U.S. at 666–78. 
109 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2013). 
110 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24–25, 28–29 (1987). 
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information for his own benefit, without first disclosing this to the source, he 
is misappropriating property of the source through fraud. It is analogous to 
embezzlement.111 If the jurisdictional means are met, this can be a violation 
of federal law. 
This misappropriation rule is problematic in the context of wire fraud if 
for no other reason that it is very unclear under state law whether trade secrets 
should be analyzed as property, or whether violation of confidentiality agree-
ments should instead be deemed a breach of contract, a tort, or a sui generis 
harm.112 This is one of the reasons, no doubt, why Bainbridge argues that 
these cases should be read as a new federal common law of trade secrets.113 
II. THE LIMITS OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
A. The Missing Loophole 
The STOCK Act was supposedly needed in order to close a loophole 
for members of Congress and their staffers.114 In fact, there never was such 
a loophole. 
Two things were absolutely clear, even before the STOCK Act was 
enacted. If a senator or representative was also a classic insider—that is, 
an officer, director, employee, or major shareholder—of a publicly traded 
company, he was subject to the same restrictions on trading stock of that 
company on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained from that 
company as any other classic insider. Similarly, if a senator or representa-
tive was a classic insider of an issuer, and disclosed material, nonpublic in-
formation about that issuer to another person, such as a family member or 
donor, both the Congress member and that person would be subject to the 
same complex case law applicable to classic tippers and tippees. 
Second, if a senator or representative was the one being tipped off about 
material, nonpublic information relevant to a public corporation by someone 
who was either a classic insider or a misappropriator, the same rules would 
apply to her as to any other tippee.115 Indeed, an intentional tip might not only 
                                                                                                                         
111 Which is how Justice Ginsburg characterized the holding of Carpenter. See 521 
U.S. at 654. 
112 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 38. 
113 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
114 For example, Donna Nagy cites an influential Wall Street Journal article, which 
asserted that “Congress is immune from insider-trading laws.” Nagy, Entrustment supra 
note 2, at 1106 (quoting Tom McGinty & Brody Mullins, Lawmaker Vows to Outlaw 
Insider Trading on the Hill, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB10001424052748704518104575546543960520172.html). 
115 Not all trading by tippees is unlawful. The Supreme Court set forth the conditions for 
unlawful tipping in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655–63 (1983). Subsequently, some lower 
courts have suggested that Dirks only sets deals with unlawful trading under the classic 
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violate the securities laws, but could conceivably implicate ethical rules and 
anti-corruption laws as well.116 
For example, although he was never formally charged, William Frist, then 
Senate Majority Leader, was criticized when he sold stock of Hospital 
Corporation of America, a company founded and dominated by his family, 
shortly before its stock price took a plunge.117 It was suspected that he was 
trading on nonpublic information about the company that he received either 
as an insider by virtue of his stock ownership or as a tippee of a family 
member, who was an insider. 
The STOCK Act is intended not to define classic insider trading, but to 
clarify whether or when the alternative misappropriation theory of outsider 
trading applies to senators, representatives, and their staffers, who obtain 
material, nonpublic information from their positions. Misappropriation in-
volves the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information received from a source other than the issuer of those securities. 
It was not clear if, or when, for example, it would be illegal for a senator to 
purchase stock in a company that he knew would benefit from some upcom-
ing, unpublicized legislation.118 Unfortunately, it is still not clear. 
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court extended the misappropriation theory 
of wire fraud to securities fraud. It held that because O’Hagan received 
information about his ex-client’s tender offer plans in a relationship of con-
fidentiality arising from his professional responsibility as an attorney, he had 
a duty to speak if he intended to breach this confidence.119 Thus, silence can 
constitute a fraud. This is a fraud “in connection with the purchase and sale 
of securities,”120 because the fraud was “consummated”121 when he traded 
                                                                                                                         
theory, and may not apply in its entirely to tips under the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., 
United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 228–31 (2d Cir. 2001). This debate is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
116 Whether or under what conditions it would is beyond the scope of this Article. 
117 David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Leader Explains His Sale of a Stock that then 
Plummeted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/22/politics 
/22 frist.html. 
118 The STOCK Act as originally proposed was also supposed to clarify the law of the 
use of so-called political information. This is information about pending legislation gathered 
by lobbyists and consultants for the purpose of selling to their investor clients. These provi-
sions were deleted from the final Act, which merely directs that the Comptroller General of 
the United States, in consultation with the Congressional Research Service, deliver a report 
on political information to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge 
Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7, 126 Stat. 291, 294–95 (2012). Political 
information is beyond the scope of this Article. 
119 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642 (1997). 
120 Id. at 653. 
121 Id. at 656  
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in Pillsbury securities on the basis of the information. The O’Hagan opinion 
raises a few anomalies that are not directly related to this Article—including 
the fact that it contemplates liability for securities fraud where there is no 
victim—neither the source nor the investment public—of securities law.122 
It also leaves unanswered some perennial questions relevant to both classic 
and misappropriation insider trading, such as whether it is sufficient if a 
defendant trades when in knowing possession of nonpublic information, or 
whether there must be some causal relationship between the information 
and the trade.123 I will discuss only those issues that I think raise the biggest 
questions for its application of the misappropriation theory to trading by 
governmental actors. 
B. The Fiduciary or “Equivalent” Duty Element 
To recap, the conundrum of the misappropriation theory arises because 
the Supreme Court insists that insider–outsider trading is only unlawful under 
Rule 10b-5 if it is deceptive. Insider–outsider trading law involves omis-
sions rather than affirmative misstatements of fact, and omissions can only 
form the basis of deception if there is a duty to speak. The mere possession 
of nonpublic information never imposes a duty to speak by itself.124 The 
Supreme Court has found a duty to speak under certain circumstances under a 
questionable reading of the special-facts doctrine derived from the common 
law of agency. This raises the question of precisely what relationship a con-
fidant must have to the source of nonpublic information to invoke the special-
facts doctrine for the purposes of misappropriation liability? 
                                                                                                                         
122 See id. at 642. The “defrauded” sources of confidential information—Grand Met and 
O’Hagan’s law firm—may or may not have a state-law claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
violation of trade-secret law, or legal malpractice. Id. at 655, 659 n.9. However, the source 
cannot sue the confidant under Rule 10b-5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723 (1975), established that only someone who actually purchases or sells securities 
can sue for securities fraud. Id. at 753–55. Investors who purchased or sold securities may 
or may not have a statutory cause of action under section 20A of the ’34 Act as contempo-
raneous traders, but cannot sue for securities fraud since the trader, by definition, owed no 
duty to speak to the public. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. 
123 See generally, Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of 
Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1129 (1999). This issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
124 “A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in 
short, gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of 
the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.” 521 U.S. at 
656. “Liability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct 
encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.” Id. at 651 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994)). 
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All three Supreme Court insider trading cases—Chiarella, Dirks, and 
O’Hagan—usually, but not always, describe the requisite relationship as 
“fiduciary.”125 However, the Supreme Court’s formulations can be read as not 
necessarily limiting fiduciary-type duties to traditional status relationships, 
suggesting that the requisite duties might be established by contract.126 
                                                                                                                         
125 At several points in O’Hagan, Justice Ginsburg describes the deception required for 
misappropriation in terms of a violation of a duty of “trust and confidence.” See, e.g., 521 U.S. 
at 643, 645, 652. She otherwise narrows this to “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving 
use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty 
and confidentiality.” 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[T]he misappropria-
tion theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted 
him with access to confidential information.”). Justice Thomas, in his dissent, agrees with 
Ginsburg’s characterization that misappropriation involves a breach of a fiduciary duty. Id. 
at 680–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I do not take issue with the majority’s determination that 
the undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary can constitute a 
‘deceptive device’….”). Elsewhere, Ginsburg quotes the government’s brief with approval, 
which describes the theory as being based on the “common law rule that a trustee may not 
use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him.” Id. at 654. Moreover, the two examples 
she gives of persons who have the type of duties necessary for insider-trading liability are 
traditional fiduciaries—i.e., officers and directors of corporations under the classic theory, and 
O’Hagan himself who, as an attorney has a fiduciary duty to his firm and client. Id. at 644. 
Similarly in Carpenter, in which the Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation theory 
in the context of wire fraud, Justice White, applying New York law, found that R. Foster 
Winans violated his fiduciary duty to his employer—The Wall Street Journal—when he 
used its confidential, proprietary information for his own purposes, without disclosing this 
intention. Justice White stated: 
[in an earlier case] we noted the similar prohibitions of the common law, 
that “even in the absence of a written contract, an employee has a fidu-
ciary obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the 
course of his employment.” As the New York courts have recognized: “It 
is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who acquires 
special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or infor-
mation for his own personal benefit but must account to his principal for 
any profits derived therefrom.” 
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1987) (emphasis added) (citing Diamond 
v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 388 
cmt. c, 396(c) (1958)). 
126 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court’s earliest insider-trading case, Justice Powell stated 
that Chiarella, the “employee of [a] financial printer which had been engaged to print cor-
porate take-over bids,” was not subject to limitations on trading because he “was not [the 
source’s] agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed 
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers 
only through impersonal market transactions.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
222, 232-33 (1980). In Dirks, Justice Powell, once again speaking for the Court, rejected 
the SEC’s argument that mere possession of material nonpublic information subjected the 
defendant to the disclose or abstain rule: 
It is undisputed that [the defendant] himself was a stranger to [the source], 
with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. He took no action, 
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Donna Nagy suggests that some lower courts and the SEC have ex-
tended the O’Hagan duty-to-speak to so many circumstances that it is no 
longer clear whether, as a practical matter, it is still limited to the fiduciary-
type duty invoked by the Supreme Court or even its functional equivalent as 
permitted by the Second Circuit.127 I think that this goes too far. Neverthe-
less, I agree that it is questionable whether the mere duties of “trust or 
confidence” reflected in the SEC’s rules, or “trust and confidence” adopted 
by some courts, are consistent with the Supreme Court precedents. This is 
why I shall suggest128 that Congress’s decision to include the duty-of-trust-
and-confidence formulation in the STOCK Act might serve as an implicit 
endorsement of this less rigorous standard in litigation against non-
congressional actors. Because Nagy does such a thorough job explicating 
the case law (and settled litigation), I will not attempt to replicate this history, 
but only raise a few points as illustration in anticipation of my analysis of 
the STOCK Act. 
                                                                                                                         
directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of [the 
source] to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no expectation by 
[the defendant’s] sources that he would keep their information in confi-
dence. Nor did [the defendant] misappropriate or illegally obtain the in-
formation about [the source]. 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (citations omitted). 
Both these passages could be read to imply by negative pregnant that the necessary re-
lationship might be merely one of “trust and confidence,” rather than the higher fiduciary 
standard, and that it might be established by contractual or other means. 
In the language from Carpenter just quoted, Justice White can be read as suggesting that it 
might also be able to establish the requisite duty of confidentiality by a written contract. But 
it is significant that the case did not involve just any type of contract, but specifically an 
employment contract. Justice White repeatedly invoked the Wall Street Journal’s company 
policy against trading embodied in its employee manual—which might suggest, on the one 
hand that the duty of confidentiality was established by Winan’s employment contract. 484 
U.S. at 23, 28. However, he emphasized that “even in the absence of a written contract, an 
employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the 
course of his employment.” 484 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 
444 U.S. 507, 515 n.11 (1980) (per curiam)). Under basic principles of principal-agency law, 
employees, as agents of their employers within the scope of their employment, have the 
fiduciary duties not to use their position for their own profit, not to use their principal’s prop-
erty for their personal purposes, and not to reveal their principal’s confidential information. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02, 8.05. Moreover, Winans might be subject to 
higher duties than ordinary employees having access to trade secrets and other confidential 
information, because of ethical duties recognized in the journalism profession. 
127 She notes that “[o]n some occasions, judicial adherence to fiduciary principles would 
have dictated rulings in favor of defendants charged with insider trading, but courts essen-
tially ignored those principles. SEC settlements in insider trading cases also reflect this 
disregard.” Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 29, at 1319 (citations omitted). 
128 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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1. Familial Relationships 
Probably the most well-known formulation of the requisite duty required 
under the misappropriation theory is contained in the Second Circuit’s pre-
O’Hagan opinion of Chestman. Famously, it found the government did not 
establish the necessary duty of confidence under either the classic or misap-
propriation theory merely by showing that the source and the confidant were 
married: “marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship.”129 
In so concluding, the Second Circuit noted that some relationships are 
“inherently fiduciary,” the classic examples being “attorney and client, exec-
utor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust bene-
ficiary, and senior corporate official and shareholder.”130 After a review of 
the case law, it concluded that the common denominator of these diverse rela-
tionships was that they all “involve[] discretionary authority and dependency: 
One person depends on another—the fiduciary—to serve his interests.”131 
The Second Circuit was particularly worried about the implications if the 
concept of a fiduciary duty or functional equivalent were interpreted broadly 
under the misappropriation theory.132 A broad interpretation would “lose 
method and predictability, taking over ‘the whole corporate universe.’”133 
                                                                                                                         
129 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 569. The court continued: 
In relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the rela-
tion may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one sort or 
another. Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the 
ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to ap-
propriate the property for his own use. 
Id. The court was not about to find that an educated woman in a modern, companionable 
marriage was so dependent on her husband as to make him her fiduciary. 
132 It stated: 
This is because a fraud-on-the-source theory of liability extends the focus 
of Rule 10b-5 beyond the confined sphere of fiduciary/shareholder rela-
tions to fiduciary breaches of any sort, a particularly broad expansion of 
10b-5 liability if the add-on, a “similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence,” is construed liberally. One concern triggered by this broadened 
inquiry is that fiduciary duties are circumscribed with some clarity in the 
context of shareholder relations but lack definition in other contexts. 
Id. at 567. 
133 Id. at 567 (citing its earlier opinion in United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 
1377 (2d Cir. 1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 480 (1977)) rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)). It continued: 
As the term “similar” implies, a “relationship of trust and confidence” 
must share the essential characteristics of a fiduciary association. Absent 
reference to the adjective “similar,” interpretation of a “relationship of 
trust and confidence” becomes an exercise in question begging. Consider: 
when one entrusts a secret (read confidence) to another, there then exists 
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Although the Second Circuit’s formulation seems to encompass fiduciary 
duties established by status, it does not necessarily exclude duties established 
by contractual principles.134 Perhaps more importantly, the Second Circuit 
referred to fiduciary duties “and their functional equivalent.”135 Finally, 
the court did not rule out that family members could establish such a duty 
through a course of conduct.136 The court, however, expressed a concern 
that an “elastic” definition of the requisite duty, while perhaps permissible 
in the civil context, would be inappropriate in a criminal litigation.137 
The law has not become clearer since. Chestman is, obviously, the law 
of the Second Circuit. But, despite its influence, various courts have held 
that either Chestman does not apply in their jurisdiction, or have found that 
the specific facts of a case have established fiduciary or equivalent duties 
between family members.138 
                                                                                                                         
a relationship of trust and confidence. Walton, however, instructs that 
entrusting confidential information to another does not, without more, 
create the necessary relationship and its correlative duty to maintain the 
confidence. A “similar relationship of trust and confidence,” therefore, 
must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship. 
Id. at 568. 
134 For example, in the subsequent pre-O’Hagan case of United States v. Libera, 989 
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), the same court found that defendants who tipped pre-publication 
information contained in unreleased Business Week articles had violated their duties to their 
employers, the printer and publisher of the magazine. Id. at 601–02. In doing so, however, 
the Second Circuit did not refer to the test of what constitutes a fiduciary relationship set 
forth in Chestman. It referred to the companies’ confidentiality policies communicated in 
employee orientation, company handbooks and posters, as well as the posting of guards to 
prevent employees from removing pre-release copies of the magazine from the premises. 
On the one hand, this might suggest that the duty can be established through contract. On 
the other, this might suggest that it is limited to employment relationships, which are tradi-
tionally fiduciary in nature under basic principles of agency. 
135 947 F.2d at 567. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 570. For example, it noted that in the earlier case of United States v. Reed, 601 
F. Supp. 685, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477, 477 (2d Cir.), 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York found “the repeated disclosure 
of business secrets between family members may substitute for a factual finding of depend-
ence and influence and thereby sustain a finding of the functional equivalent of a fiduciary 
relationship.” 947 F.2d at 569 (addressing, in this case, a father-son relationship). 
138 To give a non-exclusive list of examples, the Eleventh Circuit, in SEC v. Yun, 327 
F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003), rejected the Chestman majority’s analysis and adopted the 
minority’s urging that often, as in this case, a relationship of trust and confidence normally 
exists between spouses. Id. at 1271. In a footnote, the court noted that 
[t]he SEC’s complaint used the words “duty of trust and confidence” to de-
scribe [the wife’s] fiduciary duty to [her husband]—that she would not 
share the confidential information he gave her about [the source’s] revised 
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2. Contractual Relations 
Employees, as agents, have fiduciary duties to their employers under 
common law principles. Family relationships are uniquely intimate, whether 
or not fiduciary, and are probably sui generis. The more important and 
more controversial issue is what other relationships can impose liability for 
insider trading under the misappropriation theory. Although there seems to 
be a broad consensus that some contractually created duties may be sufficient 
to impose liability under the misappropriation theory, there is disagreement 
as to precisely what is required.139 
For example, in SEC v. Cuban, Judge Sidney Fitzwater of the Northern 
District of Texas, while agreeing that the appropriate duty could be created by 
contract, granted the defendant’s motion140 on the grounds that, as the Fifth 
Circuit explained, “at most, the complaint alleged an agreement to keep the 
information confidential, but did not include an agreement not to trade.”141 
                                                                                                                         
earnings forecast with anyone (except her attorney). In this opinion, we 
treat the quoted words and the term “fiduciary duty” as synonymous. 
Id. at 1270 n.16. 
In another case considering the nature of the relationship between spouses, SEC v. 
Goodson, No. 1:99-cv-2133-MHS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26493 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2001), 
the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia refused the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss based on the Chestman analysis on the grounds that the question of spousal duties 
is a matter of Georgia state law. Id. at *6–9. In United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 
607 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the District Court for the Southern District of New York refused the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss of an indictment because it found that the government had 
adequately alleged the existence of a spousal fiduciary duty on two grounds. First, without 
specifying whether it was intended a statement of state of federal law, the government alleged 
that it would show that, under the Chestman rule, such a duty “arose out of their express 
agreement and their history, pattern, and practice of sharing and maintaining business con-
fidences in the course of their spousal relationship….” Id. at 610. 
Finally, in SEC v. Yang, No. 12 C 2473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162157 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 14, 2013), Judge Matthew Kennelly, in rejecting the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, found that the SEC had sufficiently alleged evidence that a cohabitating 
boyfriend had the requisite duty to his partner to support a misappropriation charge because 
the two had “a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences” within the meaning of 
Rule 10b5-2. Id. at *24. The judge noted in particular that the partner’s “casual disclosure 
to [the defendant] of her login name and password, which provided access to her trading 
history, is perhaps the best evidence of the trust and confidence she shared with him.” Id. 
Moreover, the facts that the defendant “refrained from telling” his partner of his intent and 
that she testified that she was “shocked … that he had used information about her trading 
for [another defendant] to make personal trades” was evidence that the defendant “realized 
that he had misappropriated information” and therefore, had scienter. Id. at *24–25. 
139 See generally 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 613–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
140 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
141 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 2010).  
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In this case, flamboyant technology mogul and basketball team owner, 
Mark Cuban,  
agreed to maintain the confidentiality of material, nonpublic information 
concerning a planned private investment in public equity (“PIPE”) offer-
ing by [a publicly traded issuer in which he was a significant investor. The 
SEC alleged that he engaged in insider trading when] he sold his stock in 
the company without first disclosing to [the issuer] that he intended to 
trade on this information, thereby avoiding substantial losses when the 
stock price declined after the PIPE was publicly announced.142 
Jonathan Macey notes that the court’s “point that a promise to keep in-
formation confidential is not the same as a promise to refrain from trading” 
is “rather obvious.”143 In order to give rise to a legal duty to refrain from 
trading, a shareholder must have a “legal duty to refrain from trading on or 
otherwise using the information for personal gain.”144 Although the Fifth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court opinion, it did so on other 
grounds. In doing so, however, it noted that:  
[g]iven the paucity of jurisprudence on the question of what constitutes 
a relationship of “trust and confidence” and the inherently fact-bound 
nature of determining whether such a duty exists, we decline to first de-
termine or place our thumb on the scale in the district court’s determi-
nation of its presence or to now draw the contours of any liability that it 
might bring….145 
Upon remand, Judge Fitzwater rejected Cuban’s motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that “[d]espite the closeness of this question, 
there is evidence ... that would enable a reasonable jury to find that Cuban 
                                                                                                                         
142 Id. For the definition of a PIPES offering, see infra note 269. 
143 Macey, supra note 9, at 661. As Starkey DeSoto points out, the facts of the case 
seem particularly unfair. Mark Cuban was invited to “participate in the PIPE offering be-
cause he was the largest known individual shareholder of the company. After contacting 
Cuban to invite him to participate, Cuban became upset and angry. Cuban explained to the 
CEO ‘that he did not like PIPE offerings because they dilute the existing shareholders.’” 
(citations omitted). Starkey DeSoto, “Well, Now I’m Screwed”; The Ever-Expanding 
Liability for Outsider Trading, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 275, 298–99 (2012). Cuban became 
angry, famously blurting out: “Well, now I’m screwed. I can’t sell.” 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717 
(quoting Complaint ¶ 14, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2009) 
(No. 3-08CV2050-D)). That is, arguably management of the issuer was trying to shake 
Cuban down. If he did not spend good money after bad and participate in the PIPES offer-
ing he would lose even more by being diluted. This would be exacerbated if the confiden-
tiality agreement were interpreted as preventing him from cutting his losses by selling. 
144 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
145 620 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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agreed at least implicitly not to trade on the PIPE information.”146 Never-
theless, the judge specifically noted that:  
the Fifth Circuit did not disturb this court’s analysis of the law of the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading, [but] vacated and remanded 
based on the court’s erroneous evaluation of the sufficiency of the SEC’s 
complaint under the law as the court had adopted it, [accordingly Judge 
Fitzwater adhered to his earlier decision] as the law of the case.147 
 
Subsequently, a jury acquitted Cuban of all charges after a mere four hours 
of deliberation.148  
In SEC v. Lyon, Judge Sydney Stein of the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York favored the defendant in another case con-
cerning the existence of a duty of confidentiality to support misappropriation 
once again concerning a PIPE transaction.149 After a trial, the court rejected 
the SEC’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, although the 
SEC had shown that during negotiations the issuer had tried to impose such 
a duty of confidentiality, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant did 
not accept such a duty.150 Following Chestman, the court noted “[a]s a matter 
of law, defendants correctly note that ‘a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed 
unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information.’”151 
In SEC v. Obus, another judge in the same court, Judge George Daniels, 
found no breach of duty sufficient to establish insider-trading liability under 
either the classic or misappropriation theory.152 Based on the general princi-
ples of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, prohibiting the creation of federal com-
mon law,153 he applied the New York law of duties.154 This case involved 
trades by tippees from an employee of GE Capital, which was providing debt 
financing in connection with a purchase of a publicly traded corporation. 
The SEC proceeded on two theories: first, that GE Capital, and therefore 
the tipper, was a temporary insider of the corporation; and second, that the 
                                                                                                                         
146 SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30324, at *19 (N.D. 
Tex. Mar. 5, 2013). 
147 Id. at *6 n.4. 
148 Ben Protess & Lauren D’Avolio, Jury Rules for Mark Cuban in Setback for S.E.C., 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/mark-cuban 
-cleared-of-insider-trading/?_r=0. 
149 SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
150 Id. at 544. 
151 Id. at 544 (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
152 SEC v. Obus, No. 06 Civ. 3150 (GBD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98895, at *44–45, 
*50-51 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010). 
153 See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
154 Obus, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98895, at *34–36. 
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tipper misappropriated nonpublic information about the corporation from 
his employer, GE Capital.155 It is the first theory that concerns us here. In 
granting the motions for summary judgment for the tippers and tippees, the 
court stated that liability under both the classic and misappropriation theories 
required breach of a “fiduciary duty (or [its] functional equivalent).”156 
The court found that it was “undisputed that [the tipper] owed a fiduciary 
duty to his employer, GE Capital.”157 With respect to the SEC’s allegation of 
temporary insider status, the court noted that “[u]nder New York state law, 
a financial institution typically owes no fiduciary duty to its borrowers.”158 
Indeed, “[t]he arm’s-length relationship of parties in a business transaction 
is, if anything, antithetical to the notion that either would owe a fiduciary re-
lationship to the other.”159 The court did note that, although “special circum-
stances” could result in the creation of a fiduciary duty, they did not exist in 
this case, and GE Capital did not expressly agree to accept such a duty.160 
The court rejected the SEC’s argument that a duty was created because the 
corporation marked its communications to GE Capital as confidential: 
In the instant case, there is a lack of a specific confidentiality agreement 
or a retainer payment, and the dearth of facts sufficient to imply commu-
nication of an expectation by SunSource or acceptance of a fiduciary duty 
by GE Capital vis-a-vis the borrower/lender relationship. Additionally, the 
fact that SunSource was negotiating with other lenders as of the ... date of 
the alleged tip, establish that no reasonable fact-finder could find the 
existence of the required fiduciary relationship or its functional equiva-
lent. Even if, as alleged, GE Capital received confidential information, 
and SunSource unilaterally expected it to remain as such, the absence of 
any ascension on the part of GE Capital to accept such a duty precludes 
a finding of liability under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.161 
This language suggests that although a duty could be established by contract, 
it nevertheless must be fiduciary in nature, or its functional equivalent. 
The Second Circuit reversed the Southern District’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the SEC had not es-
tablished the requisite relationship. Rather, it held that the SEC had presented 
sufficient evidence to allow the issue of the relationship to go to the jury.162 
                                                                                                                         
155 Id. at *29–30. 
156 Id. at *30. 
157 Id. at *48. 
158 Id. at *38. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at *38–39 (quoting Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 886 F. Supp. 1073, 
1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
161 Id. at *43–44 (emphasis added). 
162 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 293 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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Courts have also disagreed as to nature of confidential relationships 
formed in business clubs. In United States v. Kim,163 the defendant belonged 
to a club for young executives in which it was understood that discussions of 
business matters would be private. Moreover, members were required to sign 
confidentiality agreements.164 Nevertheless, the District Court for the North-
ern District of California held that this did not create the sort of fiduciary-
type relationship of trust under the under the misappropriation theory.165 
In contrast, in SEC v. Kirch, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois granted summary judgment against a defendant on the grounds that 
membership in a business roundtable did establish such a duty.166 Although 
one might try to distinguish the two cases on the grounds that the former 
was a criminal prosecution and the latter an SEC enforcement action, the 
court did not do so, expressly rejecting the Kim analysis. 
United States v. Nothern involved the question as to whether a finan-
cial analyst owed the necessary type of duty to the U.S. Treasury with respect 
to information disclosed in a confidential press conference.167 The District 
Court for Massachusetts found that it was not bound by either Kim or 
Chestman because these were decided in rival circuits. It was “free to deter-
mine that a ‘similar relationship of trust and confidence’ exists even in the 
absence of a scintilla of superiority or dominance, as other courts (including 
some federal district courts within the Second Circuit) have done.”168 
At least one court has interpreted O’Hagan and its progeny as not requir-
ing a fiduciary or fiduciary-type relationship between a trader and his source 
under the misappropriation theory. In SEC v. McGee, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss on the grounds that the complaint failed to properly allege the requisite 
duty by holding that the case law only established that a fiduciary-type rela-
tionship was sufficient, but not necessary, to establish the requisite duty.169 
An “agreement to maintain business confidences or a history of sharing busi-
ness confidences [also] suffices.”170 In this case the defendant, a stockbroker 
and a classic insider, had  
formed a close personal relationship, which engendered mutual trust and 
confidence arising out of their [Alcoholics Anonymous] membership. 
                                                                                                                         
163 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
164 Id. at 1015. 
165 Id. 
166 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149–50 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
167 See 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D.Mass. 2009). 
168 Id. at 176. 
169 895 F. Supp. 2d 669, 673-74 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
170 Id. at 678. 
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During a confidential conversation following an AA meeting, the insider 
told McGee that he had been drinking as a result of pressure from work-
ing on the pending sale of [his company] to another company.171 
In SEC v. Conradt,172 Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New 
York refused the defendants motion to dismiss on the grounds that the SEC 
had not pled the requisite relationship between an alleged misappropriator 
and his source.173 The source of the information about an upcoming corporate 
acquisition was an unnamed, young foreign national working as an asso-
ciate for the law firm representing one of the parties to the transaction.174 
The young man entered into a close friendship with another foreigner, an 
Australian, who worked as a broker-dealer.175 During their frequent conver-
sations and hundreds of emails, in which they discussed details of their per-
sonal and professional lives, the associate eventually divulged information 
concerning the deal.176 After learning that his friend had not only traded on 
the information, but also tipped a number of friends (who were also charged 
with insider trading), the distraught Australian broker-dealer abandoned his 
position in the United States and returned to his native country.177 Although 
Judge Rakoff found that the defendants’ argument that the SEC did not suf-
ficiently allege that the “bond [between the two men] went beyond mere 
friendship into an actionable relationship of trust and confidence” was “not 
without force,” he nevertheless allowed the case to proceed by applying 
the standard that all inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving 
party.178 He noted that “the sensitive nature of many of the personal and 
professional confidences shared between Martin and the Associate bespeak 
an implicit mutual understanding of confidentiality.”179 
In this connection, although Judge Rakoff cited the language of O’Hagan, 
Chestman, and Falcone requiring that the defendant have a fiduciary or 
                                                                                                                         
171 Id. at 674 (citations omitted). The same court subsequently rejected the defendant’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal finding that the government had presented sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the 
requisite duty of “trust and confidence” to his source. United States v. McGee, No. 12-236, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103895, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2013). 
172 SEC v. Conradt, No. 12 Civ. 8676 (JSR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78381 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 6, 2013). 
173 Id. at *2–3. 
174 Id. at *1–3. 
175 Id. at *3–5. 
176 Id. at *5–6. 
177 Id. at *11. 
178 Id. at *15. 
179 Id. at *15–16. 
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equivalent duty to his source, he applied the test of Rule 10b5-2(b) which 
states that there is an actionable duty  
[w]henever the person communicating the material nonpublic information 
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or 
practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information 
knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the 
material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain 
its confidentiality….180 
 
Finally, in SEC v. Yang,181 Judge Matthew Kennelly, largely ignored the 
element of duty in dismissing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
The judge correctly ruled that the elements of an insider trading case can be 
proven by circumstantial evidence,182 and noted, also correctly in my opin-
ion, that the circumstantial evidence that the defendant had traded securities 
on the basis of material non-public information and that he acted in a decep-
tive manner was extremely strong.183 However, the judge also found that 
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to find that the defen-
dant “possessed, and knew he possessed, material nonpublic information 
from persons who owed a fiduciary duty to [the issuer’s] shareholders.”184 
The court did mention that there was evidence that the defendant had met 
with directors of the issuer in China the month before the transactions,185 but 
did not cite any evidence either that the defendant had a duty of confiden-
tiality to the source of the information or, if the source were these directors, 
that they had given the information in a manner that met the requirements for 
“tipping” liability. As we have seen, under the O’Hagan rule, the defendant’s 
trading would have been perfectly legal if the source had given him permis-
sion to trade.186  
                                                                                                                         
180 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2014). 
181 SEC v. Yang, No. 12 C 2473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162157 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2013). 
182 Id. at *7. 
183 The defendant invested almost 95 percent of the funds of a fund he managed in out-
of-the-money options in a publicly traded Chinese corporation in the two weeks before it 
announced a going-private transaction at a substantial premium over the market price. Id. at 
*4, *8–9, *11, *13–16, *18–20. 
184 Id. at *19. The judge, however, did not offer any theory as to who the source of the 
information was, and what his duties were. 
185 Id. at *11–12. 
186 There was evidence that, while working as a research analyst for one financial firm, 
he obtained a copy of a proposal labeled “highly restricted” for a management buyout pre-
pared by another investment bank. Id. at *13. Despite the fact that the case does not recite 
any evidence of how the defendant obtained it the court held that a “reasonable jury could 
find the nature of this proposal and the existence of a fiduciary duty [of the source of the 
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3. Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 
The SEC has reacted to attempts by the Supreme Court and the Second 
Circuit to cabin insider-trading liability within the confines of the tort of 
deceit by adopting Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. Rule 10b5-1 provides in rel-
evant part: 
[T]he “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by [the antifraud 
provisions of the Act] include, among other things, the purchase or sale 
of a security of an issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information 
about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence 
that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that secu-
rity or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the 
source of the material nonpublic information.187 
This formulation noticeably does not say that this duty must be fiduciary 
or its equivalent in nature. Moreover, it makes the relationships of trust and 
confidence disjunctive, rather than conjunctive.188 
Rule 10b5-2 provides that the purchase and sale of securities on the 
basis of material, nonpublic information constitutes “misappropriation in 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence” in certain non-exclusive enumerated 
circumstances. These include, “whenever a person agrees to maintain infor-
mation in confidence,” where persons have a “history, pattern or practice of 
sharing confidences” and “whenever a person receives or obtains material 
nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling ....”189 
The Rule limits the scope of when a duty is created in the context of family: 
[P]rovided, however, [in the case of duties presumably established by 
familial relationships] that the person receiving or obtaining the infor-
mation may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with 
respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the 
information expected that the person would keep information confiden-
tial, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice of sharing and 
                                                                                                                         
information to the shareholders of the issuer] would have been obvious to” the defendant. 
Id. at * 13. The problems, of course,  are that i) the issue in a misappropriation case is not 
whether or not someone had a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, but whether 
the defendant did and, ii) in a tippee case, the issue is whether the tipper received a benefit 
from tipping the defendant. 
187 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014) (emphasis added). 
188 Rule 10b5-1 also provides for affirmative defenses for certain trades and purports to 
resolve the split among courts as to whether there must be a causal link between a trader’s 
possession of the information and her trading of securities—subjects beyond the subject 
of this Article. Id. § 240.10b5-1. 
189 17 C.F.R. § 204.10b5-2. 
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maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or under-
standing to maintain the confidentiality of the information.190 
In other words, whereas the Second Circuit, concerned with the expan-
sion of the federal criminalization of state-law fiduciary duties, held that 
under New York law, such a duty does not automatically exist between 
spouses because there was no relationship of inequality and dependence 
(while suggesting that such a duty could be established under certain cir-
cumstances), the SEC purports to establish a rebuttable presumption of such 
a duty! The Second Circuit purported to apply New York law in finding that 
no duty existed. In contrast, as the SEC would seem to have no authority to 
make the common law of New York or any other state, it must be attempt-
ing to establish a federal law of duties for insider trading liability. 
Consequently, Bainbridge correctly states: “Whether the SEC has au-
thority to create a rule imposing misappropriation liability on the basis of an 
arms-length contractual duty of confidentiality—as opposed to a fiduciary 
duty-based duty of confidentiality—has not been fully tested.”191 Based on 
the principal that “[l]iability under Rule 10b-5 ... does not extend beyond con-
duct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition,”192 there is a question whether 
the SEC has exceeded its authority in promulgating these rules. Hazen, rec-
ognizing that “the trend in recent cases has been to question the validity of 
the SEC’s view of outsider trading liability,” believes that Rule 10b5-2 gets 
the policy right.193 Nevertheless, he argues that given the differences of opin-
ion on the subject, the inadequacy of the statute, and the confusion of the 
case law premised on deception, congressional action is called for to clearly 
redefine unlawful trading based on the “unfair, unequal access” justification 
rejected in Chiarella.194 
Although Nagy does not definitively conclude that Rule 10b5-2 is in-
valid, she does agree that it is an attempt to jettison the requirement that the 
trader’s duty be fiduciary or its equivalent.195 She suggests that: 
Rule 10b5-2 affects the legal landscape in even more profound ways. In-
deed, both Rule 10b5-2’s caption and its preliminary note rephrase the 
                                                                                                                         
190 Id. (emphasis added). 
191 Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 25, at 293. 
192 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
193 Hazen, supra note 75, at 887. 
194 Id. at 913. “However, as hard as [the courts] may try, the limitations of the current stat-
ute do not leave room for a coherent approach to insider and outsider trading.” Id. at 913–14. 
195 Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principals, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1319–20 (2009) [hereinafter, Nagy, Demise]. In a subsequent article, 
she characterizes her position as “question[ing]" the SEC’s authority to adopt Rule 10b5-2. 
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Supreme Court’s requirement of a fiduciary or similar relationship of “trust 
and confidence” to one of “trust or confidence.” This change from the 
conjunctive to the disjunctive extends the scope of the misappropriation 
theory considerably.196 
She correctly notes that those cases that eliminate the requirement that 
the trader’s duty be fiduciary in nature also, implicitly, expand unlawful 
trading beyond the deception paradigm—because silence can only be de-
ceptive if there is a duty to speak—to encompass the “the wrongful use of 
confidential information.”197 Although she concedes that “a majority of the 
Supreme Court has yet to endorse a doctrine expansive enough to reflect 
this view,” she seems to welcome this development.198 
I believe, in contrast, that to do so would contradict the language of 
section 10(b) which the Supreme Court has long interpreted as only encom-
passing actually deceptive activity.199 As such, whether it would be good 
policy to so broaden the scope of insider trading law would seem to be an 
issue for Congress—not the SEC or the courts. 
4. Judicial Reaction 
Despite this controversy among academics, so far only one court has ex-
pressly found Rule 10b5-2 invalid, two have found it valid, one has expressed 
disapproval in dicta, and a handful have expressed approval in dicta.200 
In Cuban, Judge Fitzwater of the Northern District of Texas rejected 
the defendant’s arguments that Rule 10b5-2 was invalid on the grounds 
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that the accused trader must have a pre-existing fiduciary relationship with 
the source.201 Nevertheless, he dismissed the case on a different theory: 
Because Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) attempts to predicate misappropriation theory 
liability on a mere confidentiality agreement lacking a non-use component, 
the SEC cannot rely on it to establish Cuban’s liability under the misappro-
priation theory. To permit liability based on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would ex-
ceed the SEC’s § 10(b) authority to proscribe conduct that is deceptive.202 
In Nothern, Judge Nathaniel Gorton of the District Court for Massa-
chusetts also found that the defendant’s argument that 10b5-2 is invalid 
because the “SEC lacks the power to promulgate rules inconsistent with 
the language of § 10(b)” to be “untenable” because the argument “is based 
entirely upon a law review article and purports to contradict persuasive 
case law holding that Rule 10b5-2(b) properly defines those circumstances 
under which misappropriation liability can arise.”203 In any event, this part 
of the opinion might be dictum because “[r]egardless of SEC Rule 10b5-
2(b), the SEC’s allegation that [the defendant] expressly agreed to maintain 
the confidentiality of Treasury information is sufficient to state a claim that 
he had a ‘similar relationship of trust and confidence’ upon which Nothern’s 
misappropriation liability may be premised.”204 
In Kim, Judge Charles Breyer of the Northern District of California 
“questioned the rule’s validity,”205 albeit in dictum, because the trades in 
question occurred before it was in effect. 
                                                                                                                         
201 See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 726–27 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2009). This 
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1006, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). Hazen suggests that “if the court was correct that dismissal 
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In contrast, in McGee, Judge Timothy Savage of the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found: 
In summary, Rule 10b5-2 was promulgated by the SEC in the exercise 
of the authority granted to it by Congress. Because the Rule was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the statute, it is enti-
tled to deference.206 
Consequently, he found that a close friendship, developed by two alcoholics 
through their membership in Alcoholics Anonymous, constituted a history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences within the meaning of the Rule.207 
There seems to be an implicit disagreement among judges in the 
Southern District of New York. Although Judge George Daniels in Obus 
did not consider the issue of the validity of Rule 10b5-2, his opinion rests 
in part on a principle that is consistent with Judge Fitzwater’s analysis in 
Cuban.208 That is, Judge Daniels held that under both the classic and misap-
propriation theories, the defendant must breach a fiduciary duty or its func-
tional equivalent. Under the rule of Erie prohibiting the creation of federal 
common law, Judge Daniels believed he was required to apply New York’s 
fiduciary duty law. The court held that although Congress could give the SEC 
statutory “rulemaking powers ... [clarifying] the duty necessary to impose 
insider trading liability,” it had not done so.209 He  noted that “[w]hile the 
SEC may promulgate a rule that imposes such a duty, provided the rule con-
forms to the rulemaking powers conferred to it by Congress, the SEC, has 
not requested statutory clarification of the duty necessary to impose insider 
trading liability.”210 This suggests that Judge Daniels would likely be in-
clined to find that Rule 10b5-2 would be invalid to the extent that it is in-
terpreted as purporting to impose liability absent a fiduciary-type duty.211 
In contrast, in United States v. Corbin, Judge Victor Marero, also of 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, found that an 
                                                                                                                         
was mandated by the terms of section 10(b), then Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is overbroad since the 
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206 SEC v. McGee, 895 F. Supp. 2d 669, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
207 Id. at 677–80. 
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indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendant had the requisite duty to 
his source under the alternate grounds of an express confidentiality agree-
ment, a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, or the spousal 
relationship.212 In doing so, he characterized Rule 10b5-2 as a “codification” 
of the case law consistent with the Second Circuit’s Chestman rule.213 He 
expressly concluded “that the SEC’s construction of § 10(b) embodied in 
Rule 10b5-2” is valid based on a Chevron analysis.214 
In United States v. Whitman, Judge Jed Rakoff, a third judge in the 
Southern District of New York, held, “[t]he scope of an employee’s duty to 
keep material non-public information confidential is defined by federal com-
mon law,” in the context of the liability of tippees of a classic insider.215 In 
doing so, Judge Rakoff noted that in promulgating Rule 10b5-2, the SEC 
promoted a policy of a uniform standard throughout the country.216 Simi-
larly, in SEC v. Yang,217 Judge Matthew Kennelly of the Northern District 
of Illinois cited the rule in his finding that a duty of confidence had been 
created between an unmarried couple. 
Other courts have cited the rule with favor, albeit perhaps as dictum. In 
SEC v. Goodson,218 Judge Martin Shoob of the Northern District of Georgia 
noted that although Rule 10b5-2 established a federal law of duty between 
spouses, it was inapplicable because it was promulgated after the trading 
occurred.219 Similarly, in SEC v. Kornman,220 Judge Sam Lindsay of the 
Northern District of Texas found that an attorney had the requisite duty of 
confidentiality to potential clients either because he was a fiduciary under 
Chestman, or because he received nonpublic information in confidence 
“bolstered” by the SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b5-2 once again subsequent 
to the trading at issue.221 In SEC v. Rocklage,222 the First Circuit Court of 
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Appeals stated that, under the facts of the case, a fiduciary-type relationship 
of confidentiality had developed between spouses.223 The court also states, 
however, that the defendants “do not seriously challenge the SEC’s alle-
gation that Mrs. Rocklage breached a duty she owed to her spouse under” 
Rule 10b5-2.224 
Finally, in SEC v. Yun,225 the Eleventh Circuit took two arguably con-
tradictory positions in dictum. On the one hand, it stated that the fact that 
the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 after the date of the trading at issue 
“bolstered” its holding that under the facts of that case the spouses bore 
the requisite duty of “loyalty and confidentiality” to each other.226 On the 
other hand, it stated that “the SEC’s new rule goes farther than we do in find-
ing a relationship of trust and confidence.”227 As Hazen has noted, “[s]ince 
the SEC cannot by rule extend the scope of the section 10(b) beyond what 
Congress intended, it would seem to follow that in the court’s view Rule 
10b5-2 exceeds the scope of the statute.”228 
What is at stake here, other than the scandal that we countenance, is 
effectively a federal common law–criminal law regime. As John Coffee 
warned as early as 1991, Carpenter and other cases have literally made a 
violation of state law fiduciary duties into a federal case—and often a fed-
eral criminal case at that.229 As I have emphasized, it is black-letter law 
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that an employee as agent may not obtain a material benefit from a third 
party from her position with her employer–principal,230 and may neither use 
her principal’s property for her own benefit nor disclose her principal’s con-
fidential information to third parties.231 Traditionally, however, violations 
of these duties merely gave the principal a cause of action against the dis-
loyal agent. Carpenter, in contrast, provides for government intervention 
into employment disputes. 
Rule 10b5-2 and the case law that expands misappropriation liability to 
contractual relationships further criminalize ordinary contract breaches.232 
Moreover, all contracts contain promises. Does this mean that a contract 
party always “feigns” honesty? Surely it proves too much to imply from this 
that breaches of contracts are frauds unless the breaching party discloses her 
intent to do so. So finding ignores Benjamin Cardozo’s classic distinction 
between the mere “morals of the marketplace” that govern contracts and 
the “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” that characterizes fiduciary 
duties.233 This worry about the over-extension of civil and criminal liability 
animated the Second Circuit’s refusal to presume the existence of fiduciary 
duties between family members in Chestman and was one of the reasons 
why the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the misappropriation 
theory in the pre-O’Hagan case of United States v. Bryan.234 
The Supreme Court has tried to limit the scope of their expansive read-
ing of fraud in two ways. First, as the term “misappropriation” indicates, it 
has tied securities fraud to the theft of intellectual property. This goal is not 
merely far afield from that of prohibiting securities fraud; it might be anti-
thetical to it.235 Second, it has tried to add a more restrictive concept of 
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when a misappropriation of nonpublic information is “in connection with 
the purchase and sale of securities.”236 As I discuss in the next sections, 
there is so little case law exploring these limitations so it is not clear how 
much of them continue to exist as a practical matter. Moreover, it is very 
hard to understand how they can be applied in the congressional context. 
C. The “Taking of Property” Element 
If the classic theory implicitly holds that certain information belongs to 
the investing public, the misappropriation theory expressly depends on the 
proposition that some information does not belong to the public, but is the 
property of the source. That is, as the very term “misappropriation” implies, 
this fraud requires that the fraudster deprive an owner of its proprietary 
rights in information conceptualized as intellectual property. 
In good Hegelian fashion, the Supreme Court recognizes that possession 
of intellectual property consists of the right to exclude others.237 This means 
that a dishonest confidant misappropriates intellectual property when he de-
prives the source of its “its exclusive use” by using it for his own purposes. 
This is fraud because a fiduciary makes an actual or implied representation 
of honesty on which the source relies. That is, he feigns honesty when he 
receives a confidence with intent to breach. This, in turn, is “in connection 
with” when the dishonest confidant “consummates” the fraud by buying or 
selling securities. In Justice Ginsburg’s words: 
A company’s confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, 
qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.... 
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a 
fiduciary duty, the Court said in Carpenter, constitutes fraud akin to 
embezzlement—“the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the 
money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”238 
In Carpenter—in which the Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation 
theory in the context of wire fraud, while splitting four–four on its applica-
tion to securities fraud—Justice White stated that “confidential business 
information has long been recognized as property.”239 He explained that the 
fraudster met the element of obtaining the source’s “property” through de-
ception because the source was “deprived of its right to exclusive use of the 
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information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business 
information and most private property for that matter.”240 Given this, it is 
surprising that courts rarely discuss the property element of misappropria-
tion directly. This might be because in many cases, this element seems to 
obviously have been met. Two cases, however, illustrate problematic aspects 
of this element. 
1. Talbot 
In SEC v. Talbot,241 the Ninth Circuit upheld a civil judgment against a 
trader under the misappropriation theory in a fact pattern in which argu-
ably the source might not have had a proprietary interest in the information. 
The defendant, Thomas Talbot, was a director of Fidelity National Financing. 
Fidelity, in turn, was a ten percent shareholder of LendingTree, a public 
company. LendingTree informed Fidelity that it was in the final stages of 
negotiating to sell itself to another company. LendingTree disclosed this in-
formation to Fidelity because it would need the major shareholder’s ap-
proval for the deal.242 This information was, in turn, relayed to Fidelity’s 
board, including Talbot, at a formal directors’ meeting. Talbot then purchased 
call options on LendingTree stock. He exercised the calls after LendingTree 
announced the sale, earning himself a tidy profit.243 The court easily dis-
posed of the defendant’s specious claims that either he did not receive, or 
did not know that he received, the information from Fidelity in a relation-
ship of trust and confidentiality.244 Certainly, discussions among directors at 
a formal board meeting concerning the disposition of a major asset would 
be confidential under Delaware corporate law.245 There was also evidence 
that there was some discussion that the board members should not trade on 
securities based on the information.246 
The court of appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the SEC 
failed to prove that either Fidelity or the defendant had a duty of confiden-
tiality to LendingTree.247 However, it rejected the lower court’s holding 
that the misappropriation theory requires that there be an unbroken chain of 
confidential relationships from the trader back to the original source of the 
information (that is, LendingTree).248  
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As so characterized, this would seem to be correct; to do so would re-
duce the misappropriation theory to the “temporary insider” variation of the 
classic theory. However, in so holding, the court may have been a little too 
quick in dismissing a point implicit in the defendant’s argument—namely, 
that in order for information to be misappropriated, the person who disclosed 
the information to the disloyal confidant must have a proprietary interest in 
that information. Information about LendingTree’s nonpublic negotiations 
to sell itself would seem to be proprietary to only LendingTree, but the court 
thought that neither Fidelity nor Talbot had any duty to LendingTree absent 
a confidentiality agreement. Consequently, the issue then becomes whether 
Fidelity had its own proprietary interest in the information that Talbot—
Fidelity’s fiduciary—could misappropriate.  
The Ninth Circuit did not make a finding of this essential element of a 
misappropriation case. Perhaps as a practical matter, this lapse is not very 
significant. Both Lending Tree and Fidelity could have their own separate 
intellectual property interests in aspects of the nonpublic information. 
With respect to LendingTree, the negotiations to sell the company itself 
would belong to LendingTree. With respect to Fidelity, knowledge concern-
ing a potential disposition of a significant corporate asset (its LendingTree 
stock) could be information that belonged to Fidelity. 
2. Rocklage 
SEC v. Rocklage,249 however, arguably provides a more serious prob-
lem. In this case, the chairman and CEO of a public bio-chemical company 
learned the material, nonpublic information that one of the company’s drugs 
had failed a trial. He disclosed this information to his wife, who tipped off her 
brother, who in turn tipped off a friend, who traded in the issuer’s stock.250 
Upon considering an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss, the First 
Circuit found that the tipper and the tippees could not be tried under the 
classic theory because the wife-tipper was neither a traditional nor tempo-
rary insider of the issuer.251 However, the court found that the wife-tipper had 
a fiduciary duty to her husband-source under the facts of this case. Conse-
quently, she committed misappropriation when she communicated material, 
nonpublic information she obtained from her husband.252 
The unasked question, however, is did the tipper’s source, her hus-
band, have any proprietary interest in the information? The Supreme Court 
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in O’Hagan stated that misappropriation occurs when the source is deprived 
of its right to exclusive use of the information.253 The issuer had a right of 
exclusive use in this information under an O’Hagan analysis, but the Court 
found that the defendant had no duty to the issuer. Under the abstain-and-
disclose rule of classic insider trading, the husband-source had no right to 
use the information for his own purposes, exclusive or not. That is, if the 
husband, rather than the issuer, is considered the source of the information, 
it is not clear how he could have had a proprietary interest so that it could 
be misappropriated. 
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties with the court’s reasoning, the out-
come seems intuitively correct within the usual parameters of insider trading 
case law. It would have been analytically preferable for the court to have 
applied the classic theory and found that the wife-tipper had a derivative 
duty to the issuer as source because there was an unbroken chain of fiduciary-
type relationships (such as, from wife to husband-officer back to issuer-
source, and from husband-officer to corporation) so that she would be a 
“temporary” insider. 
D. The “In Connection With” Element 
Fraud, or misappropriation of property can only violate § 10(b) if it is 
“in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.” Justice Ginsburg 
held in O’Hagan: 
[t]his element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not 
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without 
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell secu-
rities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.254 
Both the majority and the minority agreed that the mere fact of trading 
standing alone would not satisfy this element.255 Indeed, the government 
argued for a much narrower interpretation of the law than that adopted by 
the majority!256 What would satisfy the “in connection with” element was 
the biggest bone of contention between the majority and the minority.257 
The reason why O’Hagan violated his duty of confidence to his client, 
Grand Met, and to his firm, was in part because he needed money quickly to 
pay back funds that he embezzled from another client.258 The government 
                                                                                                                         
253 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997). 
254 Id. (emphasis added). 
255 See id. at 655–59. 
256 See id. at 684. 
257 See id. at 655–59. 
258 Id. at 648. 
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conceded that if he had used this embezzled money to purchase securities, 
the “in connection with” element would not be met because the relation-
ship between the fraud and the purchase would be too attenuated.259 Justice 
Thomas recounted that 
[i]n such a case, the Government states, “the proceeds would have value 
to the malefactor apart from their use in a securities transaction, and the 
fraud would be complete as soon as the money was obtained. In other 
words, money can buy, if not anything, then at least many things; its mis-
appropriation may thus be viewed as sufficiently detached from a subse-
quent securities transaction that § 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement 
would not be met.... Observing that money can be used for all manner of 
purposes and purchases, the Government urges that confidential infor-
mation of the kind at issue derives its value only from its utility in secu-
rities trading.260 
Justice Ginsburg thought that the government’s argument was unnec-
essarily narrow and ruled that it was sufficient if the information stolen 
was “of a sort that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-
risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities.”261 Unfortunately, as 
Justice Thomas points out, she gives no guidance as to what it means for 
information to be “of a sort” that is “ordinarily” used for no-risk profits, 
seemingly thinking that it was self-evident in this case.262 
Perhaps even more unfortunately, Justice Thomas made a weak argu-
ment in support of his excellent point that Justice Ginsburg’s distinction is 
amorphous: 
In this case, for example, upon learning of Grand Met’s confidential take-
over plans, O’Hagan could have done any number of things with the in-
formation: He could have sold it to a newspaper for publication; he could 
have given or sold the information to Pillsbury itself; or he could even have 
kept the information and used it solely for his personal amusement, per-
haps in a fantasy stock trading game …. Any of these activities would have 
deprived Grand Met of its right to “exclusive use” of the information and, 
if undisclosed, would constitute “embezzlement” of Grand Met’s infor-
mational property.263 
The reference to fantasy stock trading verges on silly. Justice Ginsburg 
was speaking about ordinary financial uses of the information—what she 
                                                                                                                         
259 Id. at 656 (quoting Brief for the United States at 24 n.13, United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306, at *24). 
260 Id. at 656–57 (citations omitted). 
261 Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
262 See id. at 681–85. 
263 Id. at 685–86 (citations omitted). 
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called “no risk profits.” Preferably, Justice Thomas might have said some-
thing like:  
“OK, the tender-offer fact pattern seems easy at first blush—the most obvi-
ous way to make money off of the stolen information would be either to short 
the stock of the bidder or go long on the stock of the target. But it is not 
really that simple. Perhaps one import of the information is that consumer 
food companies are now in play. What if O’Hagan started buying stock 
in RJR Nabisco? Or sold this information to Nabisco’s management?” 
Indeed his point is that 
the majority’s assertion that the alternative uses of misappropriated in-
formation are not as profitable as use in securities trading is speculative 
at best. We have no idea what is the best or most profitable use of mis-
appropriated information, either in this case or generally. We likewise 
have no idea what is the best use of other forms of misappropriated 
property, and it is at least conceivable that the best use of embezzled 
money, or securities themselves, is for securities trading. If the use of 
embezzled money to purchase securities is “sufficiently detached” from a 
securities transaction, then I see no reason why the non-“inherent” use of 
information for securities trading is not also “sufficiently detached” under 
the Government’s theory. In any event, I am at a loss to find in the statu-
tory language any hint of a “best-use” requirement for setting the requisite 
connection between deception and the purchase or sale of securities.264 
In other words, Justice Thomas accuses Justice Ginsburg of assuming the 
very fact—that the information is of a sort ordinarily used to makes risk-free 
trades—that she claims is an essential element of the cause of action. 
E. The “Of a Sort Ordinarily Used” Element 
There is virtually no case law that expressly discusses the element of the 
misappropriation theory that formed the primary basis of the split between 
Justices Ginsburg and Thomas in O’Hagan, namely that the misappropriated 
information be of a sort ordinarily used in the trading of securities. It is not 
at all clear what Justice Ginsburg meant by the word “ordinarily.” She appar-
ently did not mean “exclusively,” because she rejected the Government’s 
argument “that confidential information [be] of the kind [that] derives its 
value only from its utility in securities trading.”265 But the word “ordinarily” 
connotes something more than “possibly.” Does it imply “usually”? What if 
there are multiple financial uses of the information? Should we ask which 
use would be more likely? I have no idea. 
                                                                                                                         
264 Id. at 688 n.4. 
265 Id. at 657. 
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The lack of case law might at first blush suggest that this element is no 
longer a factor. Upon further consideration, it might be merely because the 
vast majority of SEC actions have been brought in a few general categories of 
fact patterns that are relatively uncontroversial: (i) the purchase of securities 
in a target of an unannounced acquisition and (ii) the purchase of securities 
in a public company immediately prior to the announcement of firm-specific 
financial information. Indeed, of the fifty-eight insider-trading actions 
brought by the SEC in 2012 highlighted on its website, twenty involved trad-
ing of this sort—as did the high profile prosecutions of Raj Rajahratnam 
and Rajat Gupta.266 
A planned acquisition (in the form of a tender offer) was, of course, 
found to be “of a sort” in O’Hagan. I would also agree that earnings reports 
and other firm-specific financial information seem intuitively to be “of a 
sort.” Of course, most SEC actions are settled before they generate any 
opinions, and the SEC does not even highlight all the cases it commences.267 
Consequently, it is difficult to know the entire universe of fact patterns that 
have generated enforcement actions. 
1. PIPE 
Two recent cases (discussed above)268 seem relatively unproblematic 
in that they involved another category of firm-specific information that 
can be expected to have a predictable effect on the price of that firm when 
announced. These are “private investment in public equity,” or PIPE trans-
actions. Because they are dilutive of existing share value, they almost always 
                                                                                                                         
266 Specifically, thirteen cases involved trading in the target of a merger or other ac-
quisition and six involved trading in the stock of an issuer prior to earnings announcements. 
Additionally, two involved trading in the stock of pharmaceutical companies prior to an-
nouncements concerning drug testing, a fact pattern I discuss immediately below. One case 
involved all three types of information. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading 
Cases, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
One of the fact patterns in the Rajahratnam and Gupta cases differed slightly from the 
classic O’Hagan fact pattern, in that it did not involve the attempted acquisition of an entire 
company, but the purchase of a major investment in Goldman Sachs by Warren Buffett’s 
Berkshire Hathaway at the height of the financial crisis. See Peter Lattman, Dealbook; 
Insider Trading Case Focuses on Defendant’s Character, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http:// 
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E0DA1239F931A25755C0A9649D8B63. 
267 For example, the SEC claims that it brought fifty-eight insider-trading enforcement 
actions in 2012, although it only highlighted twenty-three on its website. See SEC Enforce-
ment Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/spot 
light/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).  
268 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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decrease the price of a corporation’s stock.269 Several other SEC actions 
concerning trading ahead of PIPE were settled.270 
2. Drug Trials 
Another set of actions involves trading in the stock of pharmaceutical 
companies on the nonpublic information concerning clinical trials or gov-
ernment approval of drugs being developed by those companies. In SEC v. 
Rocklage, for example, the First Circuit stated, without discussion, that the 
fact that one of a corporation’s key drugs had failed a clinical trial was “the 
sort of information ‘that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain 
no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities.’”271 
In 2011 the SEC brought a civil action against Sheng Yi Liang, a chem-
ist employed by the Food and Drug Administration, accusing him of insider 
trading under the misappropriation theory in nineteen different publicly 
traded companies based on advance knowledge of FDA decisions, both pos-
itive and negative, on the companies’ drug applications.272 In 2012, the SEC 
brought civil actions against Matthew Martoma, a portfolio manager, his 
investor-advisor-employer, and Sidney Gilman, a doctor and medical school 
professor who oversaw clinical trials of an Alzheimer drug being jointly 
developed by two publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies. Allegedly, 
Martoma paid Gilman to disclose non-public information about the progress 
of the trials, positive and negative, in violation of confidentiality agreements 
between Gilman and his clients. This permitted Martoma to cause certain 
                                                                                                                         
269 In a PIPE transaction an investor buys unregistered stock in a public company in a 
private transaction with the promise that the company will register the investor’s resale of 
the stock as soon as possible. Because PIPEs are usually last ditch attempts of an issuer to 
raise capital, shares tend to be sold at a discount from the market price. Consequently, the 
price of an issuer’s shares tends to decrease when such a transaction is announced. See 
generally Snell & Wilmer LLP, Raising Capital Through a PIPE Transaction, THE 
CORPORATE HANDBOOK SERIES (2006), http://www.swlaw.com/assets/pdf/publications 
/2007/02/01/PIPE_Feb2007.pdf (discussing PIPE transactions generally). It would seem 
obvious that there will be conflicting incentives for the issuer and the PIPE investor with 
respect to disclosure. The issuer would want to keep a pending transaction confidential until 
it is consummated in order to keep the stock price as high as possible, and the investor 
would like to disclose the information prior to consummation in order to negotiate a lower 
price. As a PIPE investor would not ordinarily have any fiduciary duty to the issuer or its 
shareholders prior to the purchase, the issue of disclosure and non-disclosure is a necessary 
part of the negotiations of such a deal. 
270 See, e.g., Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 29, at 1362 n.270. 
271 470 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
656 (1997)). 
272 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, SEC v. Liang, No. 8:11-cv-00819-RWT, 2011 WL 
114504 (D. Md. June 2, 2011) [hereinafter, Liang Complaint]. 
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portfolios he and another advisor managed to take both long and short po-
sitions in the stock of the two companies, allowing them to reap profits or 
avoid losses aggregating over $276 million.273 This case has generated a tre-
mendous amount of information because Martoma was a former employee 
of the hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors L.P., and therefore threatened to 
implicate legendary investor Steven A. Cohen.274 In this case, SEC brought 
an administrative action against Cohen for failure to supervise SAC, and the 
Justice Department brought a criminal insider trading action against SAC.275 
On November 4, 2013, the SAC agreed to plead guilty to all counts of in-
sider trading violations against it and to pay a record fine and forfeitures of 
$1.8 billion, “becoming the first large Wall Street firm in a generation to 
confess to criminal conduct.”276 
Interestingly, these cases are similar to a hypothetical posed in a 
Memorandum by the House Ethics Committee: 
For example, a House employee learns in a meeting with Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) Staff that a new miracle weight loss drug is going 
to be approved by the FDA. The staffer is informed at the meeting that 
the information is confidential. The House employee then buys shares 
in the company that manufactures the drug. Once the news of the drug 
approval is made public, the company share price increases and the em-
ployee sells at a profit. As the STOCK Act explains, the employee would 
                                                                                                                         
273 Complaint ¶¶ 1, 4, SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 431 
(S.D.N.Y 2012) (No. 1:12CV08466), 2012 WL 5856296. 
274 Peter Lattman & Peter J. Henning, New Trading Case Casts a Deeper Shadow on 
a Hedge Fund Mogul, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes 
.com/2012/11/22/new-trading-case-casts-a-deeper-shadow-on-a-hedge-fund-mogul/. 
These facts are reminiscent of Sam Waksal’s guilty pleas of criminal insider trading of 
put options on the stock of ImClone. This case is well known because it is related to the 
prosecution of Martha Stewart, not for insider trading, but for lying to the government. 
Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12, at 2023–25. Waksal, the founder, an officer and director 
of ImClone, purchased put options on the company’s stock when the FDA informed it that 
it had decided not to consider its application for approval of its new cancer drug. As such, 
this was a simple, open-and-shut case of classic insider trading. 
275 See Steven A. Cohen, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3634, Admin. Proc. File 
No. 3-15382 (July 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-3634.pdf; see also 
Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. USA-33s-274, 13 Crim 
541 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/SAC 
ChargingAndSupportingDocuments/SAC%20Indictment%20(Stamped).pdf. The SEC has 
also settled a civil action against SAC. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n., CR 
Intrinsic Agrees to Pay More than $600 Million in Largest-Ever Settlement for Insider Trad-
ing Case (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press /2013/2013-1.htm. 
276 Ben Protess & Peter Lattman, After a Decade, SAC Capital Blinks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2013, at B1. See also Press Release, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty 
Plea Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November13/SACPleaPR.php. 
2014] INSIDER, OUTSIDER TRADING BY CONGRESS 215 
be subject to liability for violation of federal civil and criminal insider 
trading statutes.277 
This may or may not be an accurate description of the effect of the statute. 
What all these fact patterns have in common is that they only apply to a 
person who trades securities of the issuer that was developing the drug that 
was subject to the FDA approval process. The fact that the nonpublic in-
formation about the drug was, in fact, used to trade in the stock of the devel-
oper is certainly evidence that it is of a sort that can be used for this purpose. 
But does it follow from this that it is of a sort ordinarily used for this pur-
pose? The SEC does not expressly raise this issue in its complaint against 
Liang, although it might be setting the background for such an argument 
when it states: 
Liang traded in the securities of developmental drug companies, as op-
posed to larger drug companies. With respect to developmental drug 
companies, an FDA decision, positive or negative, would likely have a 
significant impact on the stock price of the drug company, and therefore 
generate a greater opportunity to profit.278 
It would seem that the information about a drug trial by one company 
would be both relevant and financially valuable not only to the company de-
veloping the drug, but to rival companies working on competing treatments, 
members of the medical and healthcare professions who treat people with 
the condition, as well as patients who are considering treatment options. 
3. Pre-publications Articles 
But how would the original misappropriation case of United States v. 
Carpenter be decided under O’Hagan? In that case, a Wall Street Journal 
columnist, R. Foster Winans, knowing that the market tended to react to his 
columns—the popular Heard on the Street series—“stole” the WSJ’s secret 
production schedule, which he received as an employee on a confidential 
basis. That is, knowing what day of the week a specific column would run, 
he and his co-conspirators would buy or sell securities of issuers to be men-
tioned in the column the next day. Is this the sort of information that was 
“ordinarily” used to obtain risk-free profits? Or would it be “ordinarily” 
                                                                                                                         
277 Memorandum from United States H.R. Comm. on Ethics to All House Members, 
Officers, and Employees: New Ethics Requirements Resulting from the STOCK Act 
(Apr. 4, 2012), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/Stock%20Act%20Pink 
%20Sheet.pdf. 
278 Liang Complaint, supra note 272, at ¶ 61. 
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more valuable to sell to the New York Times or the Financial Times who 
would want to scoop their rival publication?279 
In perhaps the most closely analogous case, United States v. Falcone, 
then Circuit Judge Sonya Sotomayor, writing for the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, stated that O’Hagan’s “ordinarily” element was “met in a case where, 
as here, the misappropriated information is a magazine column that has a 
known effect on the prices of the securities of the companies it discusses.”280 
In the Court’s infelicitous formulation, the “charges arose from a scheme 
involving the misappropriation of pre-release confidential copies of a mag-
azine column that discussed securities for the purpose of trading in the secu-
rities of the featured companies.”281 
Judge Sotomayor relied on the Second Circuit’s earlier opinion in 
Carpenter,282 which was sustained when the Supreme Court split 4–4 on 
                                                                                                                         
279 When The Wall Street Journal discovered the scheme, it advised the government and 
ran a front-page article on the story. I remember poring over the story with fascination as a 
young associate, for no other reason than the Journal made sure to out Winans as the gay 
lover of the named defendant, Carpenter—a fact that would be unremarkable today, but was 
extremely scandalous in the early 1980’s, during the height of the AIDS panic. 
I would wager the Journal was probably not primarily concerned with market integrity, 
efficiency, preventing securities fraud, or protecting the confidentiality of its production 
schedule (although these may have been secondary concerns). Rather, as the foremost fi-
nancial publication in the United States, it was more likely worried about its reputation for 
journalistic integrity. The Wall Street Journal, like most reputable newspapers, has a strict 
code of journalistic ethics that requires their reporters to avoid any behavior that might raise 
even a suspicion of a conflict of interest. Indeed, the only reason why Winans’ actions could 
be deemed misappropriation is because the Journal’s code imposed such high standards 
of confidentiality. 
Similarly, I would also wager that when the DOJ prosecuted Winans and his friends, it 
is likely that the Department was not so much concerned with traditional insider trading, but 
with the prevention of another harm—namely manipulation. Although in this case, Winans 
apparently did retain some journalistic ethics and did not manufacture false stories purely 
for the sake of affecting prices, nor did he manipulate the timing of his stories. However, a 
reporter, who was permitted to trade, would obviously be tempted to do so—which is why 
the Journal and many reputable news sources prohibits such trading. Although manipula-
tion itself can be a crime, it is a notoriously difficult one to prosecute because of the strict 
requirements of section 9(a), including its “double scienter” element. Consequently, the DOJ 
tends to bring manipulation cases under section 10(b) as well as 9(a). 
280 United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2001). This case is probably 
most well-known for the holding that elements of a tipping allegation under the misap-
propriation theory differed from those of Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), under the 
classic theory—a topic beyond the scope of this Article. 
281 257 F.3d at 227. The Second Circuit had upheld a conviction on almost identical facts 
under the misappropriation theory in the pre-O’Hagan case of United States v. Libera, 989 
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). Consequently, an issue was whether the Second Circuit’s inter-
pretation of the theory survived O’Hagan. 
282 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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appeal. It is not clear, however, whether the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of this theory in Carpenter meets the standard of O’Hagan. 
Judge Pierce, in Carpenter, stated that “the misappropriated information 
regarding the timing and content of certain [newspaper] columns had no 
value whatsoever to appellants except in connection with their subsequent 
purchases and sales of securities.”283 Oddly, in supporting her holding in 
Falcone, Judge Sotomayor observed: 
[W]hile the O’Hagan majority’s response to Justice Thomas’s criticism of 
the “ordinarily” standard was to note his “evident struggle to invent other 
uses to which O’Hagan plausibly might have put the nonpublic informa-
tion,” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 657 n.8, the struggle is not necessarily as 
difficult in a case in which the information is misappropriated from a 
publication. In this case, for example, Hudson News employee Salvage 
began violating company policy in late 1994 by taking copies of golf mag-
azines and Playboy magazines and giving them to his neighbor Smath, and 
Smath appears to have initially added a request for financial magazines 
simply because he was in the process of learning to be a stockbroker.284 
In other words, in support of her conclusions that this information had 
no other value to the defendant and was of a sort ordinarily traded on, she 
volunteers alternative uses the information could be—and actually was—
used for! 
One might raise my objection to Justice Thomas’s unconvincing exam-
ple of an alternate use of information concerning a planned tender offer—
namely that Justice Ginsburg and Judge Sotomayor were speaking about 
financial uses for the information (i.e., “no-risk profits”). But one can fairly 
readily think of valuable uses of pre-publication information. The defendant 
might have been able to tip off rival publications or other media outlets to 
the information in exchange for a kickback. 
Moreover, Judge Sotomayor adds this odd footnote: 
While the Supreme Court in O’Hagan, in the course of reviewing prior 
decisions in which it had not reached the misappropriation theory ques-
tion, cited approvingly to a law review article which referred to the mis-
appropriation from a publication in Carpenter as constituting an “unusual 
case” because “the information there misappropriated belonged not to a 
company preparing to engage in securities transactions, e.g., a bidder in a 
corporate acquisition, but to the Wall Street Journal,” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
at 650 n.4, it made no comment regarding the extent, if any, that that 
unusual element affected whether the misappropriation was “in connec-
tion with” a purchase or sale of a security.285 
                                                                                                                         
283 Id. at 1033 (emphasis added) (quoting SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 
1984)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
284 257 F.3d at 234 n.5. 
285 Id. at 234 n.5 (quoting Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter 
and its Aftermath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 375 (1988)). 
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In other words, she seems to argue that although the O’Hagan majority 
did note that the journalism facts were “unusual,” the fact that they did not 
specify whether this difference is meaningful is a reason to conclude that it 
is not. An alternate implication would be that the majority’s highlighting of 
the difference meant that it intended that future courts consider that issue. 
Another post O’Hagan case in the Southern District of New York, 
SEC v. Seibald, also involved a pre-publication tip of information contained 
in an article.286 Unfortunately, the court did not even mention the “of a sort” 
element of a misappropriation case. It may have thought it was bound by the 
earlier Second Circuit opinions in Carpenter and the pre-O’Hagan case of 
United States v. Libera,287 although it failed to cite either case. 
Arguably, however, the fact pattern more easily meets the “in connec-
tion” element than do Carpenter, Libera, and Falcone, all of which involve 
pre-publication information in publications directed to the general public, 
namely The Wall Street Journal and Business Week. In Seibald, the publi-
cations in question were impending research reports by Salomon Brothers, 
a major investment bank.288 The SEC noted that “as is the case with many 
reports of this nature, [the defendant’s] reports had the ability to move the 
market. Investors would read the report and then buy and sell accordingly 
which would increase or decrease the price of the stock.”289 I would go 
further. Unlike the articles in the other cases which might be expected to in-
fluence trading as a matter of fact, the research reports were distributed to 
the firm’s clients and salesmen with the express purpose to influence stock 
trading.290 That is, the reason why a client reads a research report is to help 
her decide whether to buy, sell, or hold securities; and the reason a sales-
person reads them is to help her to persuade clients to trade securities in 
order to generate commissions. 
4. The Apparent Outlier That Was Not? 
One recent case that does not even mention the “of a sort” requirement 
might at first blush seem to illustrate how tenuous this element has become. 
                                                                                                                         
286 SEC v. Seibald, No. 95 Civ. 2081 (LLS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14940 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 1997) (granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion on one account, but 
denying it on all other counts). 
287 United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). Libera also involved trading 
based on articles contained in pre-release issues of Business Week which were distributed 
by an employee to his conspirators in violation of his employer’s confidentiality policy. Id. 
at 599. As O’Hagan had not yet established the “of a sort” element, it was not discussed. 
288 Seibald, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14940, at *2–3. 
289 Id. at *4. In Seibald the SEC also alleged that the defendant had tipped others off on 
a merger that Salomon was advising on. Id. 
290 Id. at *3 n.1, *3–4. 
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It ostensibly involved disclosures about a source’s interest in real estate. 
Upon further consideration, however, this is true only if one reads the facts 
overly literally and does not read between the lines. 
In SEC v. Berrettini,291 an employee of an acquisition-minded public cor-
poration in the medical services industry would ask a friend—a real estate 
broker—about properties that happened to be in the cities in which acquisi-
tion targets were located. He claimed that this was a part of his employer’s 
due diligence. The employee would not tell the broker that the employer was 
contemplating a corporate acquisition. Based on this information, the broker 
would deduce what medical services companies were located in the vicinity, 
conclude that they were acquisition targets and purchase their securities. In 
exchange, the broker-tipper would allegedly make kickbacks disguised as 
loans to the employee-tipper.292 The District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and found 
that the SEC had presented a sufficient case of insider trading under the 
tipper–tippee misappropriation theory for the case to proceed.293 
This seems to be a classic case of a disloyal agent profiting from his posi-
tion that would give the employer–principal a right to recover his ill-gotten 
gains under the common law of agency. At first blush, the information tipped 
to the broker-tippee—the employer’s interest in real estate—would hardly 
seem to be of a sort ordinarily used in securities trading. Indeed, this infor-
mation seems most directly related to the purchase and sale of real estate. 
This invokes the facts of Texas Gulf Sulphur,294 in which the Second Circuit 
contrasted securities law, which is based on disclosure, and other real prop-
erty law, which protects secrecy. 
However, the court implicitly assumed that the tip of the source’s inter-
est in real estate was, in fact, intended as a not-so-subtly disguised tip of the 
source’s true interest in the owners of the real estate. That is, the SEC and 
the defendants disagreed as to  
whether Pirtle shared information about the target companies with Berrettini 
because he was (legitimately) being used as an outside contractor to help 
Pirtle with his substantial workload, or if the “research projects” that 
Pirtle claims to have given Berrettini were simply a cover for Pirtle’s tips 
about Philips’ business plans.295 
                                                                                                                         
291 SEC v. Berrettini, No. 10-cv-01614, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163476 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 15, 2012). 
292 Id. at *4–12. 
293 Id. at *40. 
294 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843–47 (2d Cir. 1968). 
295 Berrettini, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163476, at *4. 
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In other words, the facts show that the tipper–employee was expressly 
told that he was subjected to a duty of confidentiality with respect to negoti-
ations concerning the acquisition of businesses, so he tried to get around this 
by never expressly referring to the targets—but nonetheless strongly hinting 
at their identity. The court saw through what seems like a crude attempt to 
comply with the confidentiality agreement in word but not in spirit.296 Inter-
preted this way, this seems to be yet another in the long line of misappropri-
ation cases involving tips of information from acquirers that led to trading 
in targets similar to the original O’Hagan template.297 
5. Common Elements 
What these seemingly divergent categories have in common is that they 
all involve firm-specific information of a type that can reasonably be ex-
pected to affect the price of the equity securities of that firm, and the defen-
dants, in fact, traded in equity securities (or options) in that firm. Whether 
this means the information in these cases was “of a sort that misappropria-
tors ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase 
or sale of securities,” it was a sort that could and was used for this purpose. 
This suggests that the SEC and the DOJ have chosen not to push the enve-
lope as to what this element might mean. However, as I already mentioned, 
in many of these cases, the information could be used for other purposes. 
Most obviously, what if someone used such firm-specific information to 
purchase or sell securities of similarly situated or rival firms? For example, 
on January 14, 2013, Facebook announced that it would be making an im-
portant announcement the following day. It is clear that if Mark Zuckerberg, 
Facebook’s founder, CEO, and controlling shareholder, purchased shares of 
Facebook on January 13th, he would be engaging in classic insider trad-
ing. What if he both understood that such trading would violate the law yet 
wanted to capitalize on this information? It turned out that the announce-
ment concerned a new search capability. Would he be liable for misappro-
priation if he purchased put options on search-giant Google’s stock, on the 
assumption that the announcement of new competition would negatively 
impact its stock price? 
One might argue that, although the nonpublic information was not firm-
specific with respect to Google, it nevertheless was relevant to the price of 
                                                                                                                         
296 Id. at *38–39. 
297 The court noted that “[a]ccording to his own testimony, Pirtle understood that the 
geographic location of the target company was confidential information. He understood that 
‘[i]f you disclose the real estate location, then you could easily determine the occupant of 
the location and the company’s name.’” Id. at *8. 
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Google stock. Indeed, some financial journalists predicted that Google’s 
stock would drop. In fact, the price of Google stock did not change signif-
icantly in the next two days, so a short play would have resulted in a loss. 
This suggests that the information would not have led to risk-free profits in 
this case. This does not tell us, however, whether it was “of a sort” that could 
“ordinarily” be capitalized upon to make “risk-free profits in the securities” 
within Justice Ginsburg’s formulation.298 
It turns out that the stock that was most affected by the Facebook an-
nouncement was neither Facebook’s nor Google’s, but Yelp’s, which de-
scribes itself as “an online urban city guide that helps people find cool 
places to eat, shop, drink, relax and play, based on the informed opinions of 
a vibrant and active community.”299 Presumably, some segment of the 
market believed that Facebook’s new search capacity was likely to impact 
smaller, specialized social networking firms, not rival search firms.300 
The problem becomes even more difficult when we turn to information 
that is not firm-specific, but which may be expected to positively or nega-
tively affect certain industries. I will turn to this when I discuss the appli-
cation of the STOCK Act.301 
F. The “Non-Disclosure” Element 
Outsider trading can be securities fraud only if the trader violates a duty 
of disclosure to the source of the information. The corollaries to this are 
that (i) “if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the 
nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) 
violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state 
law for breach of a duty of loyalty”302 and (ii) there would be no breach if 
the source gives the fiduciary permission to trade on the information303 
(although, in both of these cases, in the context of a tender offer, the trade 
might violate Rule 14e-3). As Justice Thomas correctly notes, this seems 
anomalous because “in either case—disclosed misuse or authorized use—
the hypothesized ‘inhibiting impact on market participation,’ ... would be 
identical to that from behavior violating the misappropriation theory....”304 
                                                                                                                         
298 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 688 n.4 (1997). 
299 Frequently Asked Questions: What is Yelp?, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/faq#what 
_is_yelp (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
300 Peter Kafta, Wall Street to Yelp: Facebook Search Should Scare You, 
ALLTHINGSD.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 6:15 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20130116/wall-street-to 
-yelp-facebook-search-should-scare-you/. 
301 See infra Part III. 
302 521 U.S. at 655. 
303 This is one of the arguments against the misappropriation theory made by Justice 
Thomas in his dissent. Id. at 689. 
304 Id. at 689–90 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Ginsburg refers to this anomaly as an unfortunate example of a 
statute being under-inclusive.305 This is incorrect. It is mandated by the very 
logic of her reading of the misappropriation theory, which is premised on the 
proposition that the source owns the nonpublic information. That is, by defi-
nition under trade-secret law, the owner of nonpublic information has the 
right to exploit it and has no duty to disclose it to the investment public. It fol-
lows from this that it also has the right to grant others the right to exploit it.306 
I will not explore the notorious implications of this anomaly in detail because 
I doubt that they are relevant to the problems with congressional trading. 
In O’Hagan, the language of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion can be read 
literally to say that there is no insider-trading liability so long as the confidant 
discloses his intent to the source before he trades.307 This is known as the 
brazen-misappropriator problem.308 In the one case to consider the timing 
issue, SEC v. Rocklage, the First Circuit interpreted O’Hagan as providing 
that disclosure is a “safe harbor” only available if the information was origi-
nally obtained without deception.309 That is, the court assumes, despite any 
express supporting language in the case, that O’Hagan only decided to use 
the information about the impending Pillsbury tender offer for his own ne-
farious purposes after he legitimately received this information.310 In con-
trast, in Rocklage, a wife “tricked her husband into revealing confidential 
information” when she had a pre-existing intent to tip her brother.311 Conse-
quently, the court was “unwilling to say that O’Hagan requires us to con-
clude that [the defendant’s] post-acquisition disclosure of her intention to tip 
somehow rendered her acquisition of information non-deceptive” and denied 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.312 
Although the First Circuit’s analysis seems eminently reasonable with-
in the policy of O’Hagan, I am not sure that it can be reconciled with its 
                                                                                                                         
305 “[T]he fact that § 10(b) is only a partial antidote to the problems it was designed to 
alleviate does not call into question its prohibition of conduct that falls within its textual 
proscription.” Id. at 659 n.9. 
306 See Schroeder, Envy, supra note 12. 
307 See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997)). 
308 Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 29, at 1344; BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING, 
supra note 31, at 116. 
309 SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006). 
310 Although the Supreme Court did not mention this fact, it strikes me as a not unrea-
sonable assumption. That is, O’Hagan, who was not an attorney on this deal, presumably did 
not inveigle the information from either Grand Met or his partners. Rather, he likely would 
have learned it in the ordinary course of partnership business and subsequently succumbed 
to the temptation to use it for his own purposes. 
311 470 F.3d at 8. 
312 Id. at 12–13. 
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language. Indeed, in dictum, Judge Fitzwater in Cuban rejected this inter-
pretation of O’Hagan, noting “it did not hold that the recipient must give 
the source sufficient notice to enable the source to prevent the recipient’s 
use of the information.”313 
I will not discuss this issue further here. I believe that the likelihood of 
encountering such a brazen congressional misappropriator is low.314 
III. APPLICATION OF THE STOCK ACT 
In adopting the STOCK Act, Congress did not take up the hard task of 
defining when securities trading by governmental personnel is unlawful or 
even inappropriate. Although various earlier versions of the bill had more 
specific language, they languished in Congress for years until press reports 
and President Obama’s State of the Union speech made congressional trading 
a matter of embarrassment.315 It is not, perhaps, surprising that this resulted 
in the quick adoption of a toothless statute. As Jack Maskell, Legislative 
Attorney with the Congressional Research Service, states in a report to Con-
gress, the STOCK Act was intended to correct the public misperception that 
Congress had exempted itself from the securities laws.316 Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                         
313 SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30324, at *20 n.9 
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013). Nevertheless, the judge rejected Cuban’s motion for summary 
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(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010). A recent case may present an opportunity to consider the issue 
of disclosure prior to trading. In SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) the Court of 
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could constitute unlawful insider trading under the misappropriation theory. The defendant 
was an officer of the investment advisor that managed the fund whose shares she redeemed. 
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a deceptive breach of her duty of loyalty to [the investment advisor/ source] 
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opening of the trade window for [the investment advisor/source’s] em-
ployees, which constituted authorization to trade; and (2) [the defendant] 
identified herself as an ... employee [of the source] when placing the 
call to redeem her shares, which constituted disclosure to the principal. 
723 F.3d at 771 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 n.9 (1997)). 
315 See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. 
No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
316 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42495, THE STOCK ACT, INSIDER 
TRADING, AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL REPORTING BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS 1–2 (2012), https:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42495.pdf. 
224 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159 
provisions of the act relating to insider trading merely affirm that congres-
sional members are not exempt, “makes explicit the duty of confidentiality 
and trust that all public employees have concerning material, nonpublic 
information that comes to them by virtue of their federal employment,” and 
direct the Ethics Committees of the two houses to adopt rules “‘clarifying’ 
that Members and staff are prohibited from using nonpublic information 
derived from their positions ‘as a means for making a private profit.’”317 
That is, the STOCK Act does not change the law at all. At most it casts a 
dim light on congressional duties, but leaves the other elements of this no-
toriously fuzzy cause of action in the dark. In other words, if the SEC and 
the DOJ felt uncertain in their ability to bring actions against members of 
Congress and their staffers in the past, they will probably continue to feel 
this way. 
In this section, I discuss the problems of application of the STOCK Act. 
I will only mention in passing the reporting requirements of the Act, even 
though their potential shaming effect might do the most for discouraging 
trading that has the appearance of impropriety. I start, instead, with the least 
inadequate aspect of the Act’s attempt to make certain trading unlawful: the 
provision relating to duties. I then dispose quickly with two “loopholes” in 
the Act, which I believe are likely to be nonissues as a practical matter. I then 
turn to the remaining elements of the misappropriation theory that the Act 
does not address. 
A. Fiduciary Duties or Their Equivalent 
Apparently, Representative Louise Slaughter, co-sponsor of the STOCK 
Act, believed that the insider-trading prohibitions did not apply to members 
of Congress and their staffers.318 As discussed,319 although there was no 
                                                                                                                         
317 Id. 
318 According to Barbabella et al., “[b]oth Slaughter and the Wall Street Journal have 
quoted Thomas Newkirk, a former SEC official and current partner at Jenner and Block”: 
If a congressman learns that his committee is about to do something 
that would affect a company, he can go trade on that because he is not 
obligated to keep that information confidential. He is not breaching a 
duty of confidentiality to anybody and therefore he would not be liable 
for insider trading. 
Barbabella et al., supra note 4, at 219 (citing Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider 
Trading By Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1). Andrew George 
asserts that the legality of congressional trading prior to the STOCK Act was “conventional 
wisdom,” although he argues that it in fact is unlawful misappropriation. Andrew George, 
Public (Self)-Service: Illegal Trading on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 162–63 (2008). 
319 See infra notes 328, 331. 
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express congressional exemption, legal scholars disagreed as to whether 
members of Congress and their staffers had the type of duties to a source 
sufficient for a misappropriation case with respect to information obtained 
from their positions.320 Bainbridge forcefully argues that staff, who are mere 
employees of the United States government, might have such a fiduciary or 
similar duty of confidence to the government. He thinks that it is a stretch, 
however, to analyze senators and representatives as mere employees.321 
Donna Nagy just as forcefully argues that, of course, members of Congress 
and their staffers “owe fiduciary-like duties of trust and confidence to a host 
of persons including the citizen-investor whom they serve, as well as the fed-
eral government, other members of Congress, and government officials out-
side of Congress … who rely on their loyalty and integrity.”322 Consequently, 
she believes their trading in securities on the “basis of material nonpublic in-
formation obtained through congressional service” would constitute insider-
outsider trading if the other elements of the cause of action exist.323 
There is limited case law in other contexts suggesting government of-
ficials have fiduciary duties.324 For example, in 1988—nine years before 
O’Hagan—the government indicted Robert A. Rough, a former member of 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank, for insider trading in connection with 
the leaking of interest rate information to a brokerage firm.325 The charges 
were dropped after he pled guilty to one charge of bank fraud.326 
Nagy notes that although members of Congress “have been indicted for 
defrauding the federal government and its citizen[s] through the misap-
propriation of funds and other tangible property,” to date there has been no 
                                                                                                                         
320 For a survey of opinions on this issue, see Matthew Barbabella et al., supra note 4. 
321 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281 
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322 Nagy, Entrustment, supra note 2, at 1111. 
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“new statute explicitly prohibiting the offense of insider trading would be a very welcome 
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324 Bud W. Jerke, Cashing in on Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political 
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Woodard, 459 F.3d 1078, 1086 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Peltz 433 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1970)). See also id. 1484–
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theory.” Barbabella et al., supra note 4, at 216. 
325 Joseph F. Sullivan, A Former Official of Federal Bank Indicted as Insider, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/09/business/a-former-official-of 
-federal-bank-indicted-as-insider.html. 
326 Shift by U.S. in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1989), http://www.nytimes 
.com/1989/08/30/business/shift-by-us-in-insider-case.html. 
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reported case finding liability of an official under the misappropriation 
theory.327 In 2011, however, the SEC brought a cause of action against Cheng 
Yi Liang, a chemist with the FDA, for trading in the stock of pharmaceutical 
firms based on nonpublic information about FDA decisions concerning their 
drug applications. In doing so, the SEC relied on the Department of Health 
and Human Services rules that state: 
 
Government employees are sometimes able to obtain information about 
some action that the Government is about to take or some other matter 
which is not generally known. Information of this kind shall not be used 
by the employee to further his/her or someone else’s private financial or 
other interests. Such a use of official information is clearly a violation of 
a public trust. Employees shall not, directly or indirectly, make use of, 
or permit others to make use of information not made available to the 
general public.328 
 
The SEC also noted that the  
 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch pro-
vides that “[a]n employee shall not engage in a financial transaction using 
nonpublic information, nor allow the improper use of nonpublic informa-
tion to further his own private interest or that of another, whether through 
advice or recommendation, or by knowing unauthorized disclosure.”329 
 
Furthermore, the general principle is that “[p]ublic service is a public 
trust. Each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government 
and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical princi-
ples above private gain.”330 
Although these formulations do not use the specific language “fiduciary 
duty,” the standards imposed by these policies are so high that it might satisfy 
even those required by the Second Circuit, and would support an insider 
trading action if the other elements of misappropriation were met.331 In 
contrast, the STOCK Act neither adopts the high standards of the HHS reg-
ulation nor refers to fiduciary duties. Rather, the STOCK Act references the 
controversial language of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 by stating that covered 
                                                                                                                         
327 Nagy, Entrustment, supra note 2, at 1149. She refers specifically to former Represen-
tatives Charles Diggs and Daniel Rostenkowski and former Senator David Durenberger. 
328 Liang Complaint, supra note 272, at ¶ 46 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-307(a)(4) 
(2014) (setting forth the ethics rules for the use of official information by employees of the 
Department of Health and Human Services)). 
329 Id. ¶ 47 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a) (2014)). 
330 Id. ¶ 50 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a) (2014)). 
331 The case is, in fact, being brought in the Maryland District Court, which is in the 
Fourth Circuit. 
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persons have a “duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidentiality 
with respect to certain information,” but only for the purposes of the insider 
trading prohibitions of the ’34 Act.332 
Interestingly, the Senate Committee of Ethics’s December 4, 2012 
Memorandum on restrictions on insider trading does not limit the duties 
that may impose restrictions on trading to those clarified in the STOCK 
Act.333 The Memorandum counsels that some securities trading may vio-
late federal government ethics standards, Senate nondisclosure rules, and 
Senate conflict-of-interest rules. It suggests, however, that violation of these 
standards and rules might be grounds for action by the Committee.334 
Consequently, there might be a lingering concern that a court (such as the 
Second Circuit, which has required fiduciary-type duty of confidentiality) 
might hold that the language of the STOCK Act might establish the ethical 
obligations of Congress and its employees under Congressional rules of prac-
tice. The language of the STOCK Act, however, is insufficient to establish 
liability under the ’34 Act. Of course, anything can happen, but these sce-
narios seem unlikely as a practical matter. Both the preamble of the STOCK 
Act, which states its purpose, as well as section 4, which amends section 21A 
of the ’34 Act to provide that members of Congress and their staffers have 
a duty of “trust and confidence” “for purposes of the insider trading prohi-
bitions,” indicate that, despite its inartful drafting, the STOCK Act was 
intended to confirm that members of Congress and their staffers do have 
the appropriate type of duty to impose liability. The more practical problem 
with the legislation is that it does not clearly establish how the other ele-
ments of the O’Hagan text will be met. 
To reiterate, the Supreme Court has held that a breach of a fiduciary or 
equivalent duty per se does not constitute securities fraud.335 Fraud requires 
that the fiduciary breach a duty to speak, and ties this duty to the taking of 
proprietary information. Further, this fraud is only securities fraud if the in-
formation stolen is of a sort ordinarily used to reap risk-free profits through 
the trading of securities.336 
                                                                                                                         
332 See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. 
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228 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159 
Ironically, therefore, it could be that the most important legacy of the 
STOCK Act will be the law of outsider trading applicable to other defend-
ants. That is, by choosing to track the language of Rule 10b5-2, rather than 
that of O’Hagan or Chestman, Congress may be deemed to have implicitly 
endorsed this rule with respect to non-members of Congress or their staffers. 
B. Non-Concerns 
Before moving on to some potentially legitimate concerns about the 
applications of the STOCK Act, let me dispose of the non-issues: (i) trading 
by family members and (ii) non-deceitful trading. 
1. Trading By Family Members 
Shortly after the STOCK Act’s enactment, CNN published an exclu-
sive “uncover[ing] that the law ... isn’t exactly as advertised. A loophole 
could still allow family members of some lawmakers to profit from inside 
information.”337 The article quotes then-Senator Scott Brown: “Say I find 
out some information, I tell my wife and she goes and trades on it, what’s 
the difference?”338 
This “loophole” seems to have been as mythical as the imaginary con-
gressional exemption from insider-trading law that supposedly existed be-
fore the STOCK Act. If a trade done directly by a member of Congress or 
their staff would be unlawful, then the same trade done by a family member 
should also be unlawful in almost all cases under one of two theories. 
First, insider-trading law governs the trading of securities held benefi-
cially, as well as of record. Beneficial ownership is defined as the right to 
control, directly or indirectly, the voting or disposition of securities.339 This 
obviously must be the case if for no other reason that few individuals own 
securities in their own name, but own them indirectly through brokers, banks 
depositories and other “security intermediaries,” to use the terminology of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.340 Consequently, a member of Congress can-
not get around the securities laws merely by transferring securities into the 
name of a spouse, child, or parent, if the member retains the ability—even 
informally—to direct the disposition of the securities. 
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339 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2014). 
340 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (1994). 
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Second, even in the unusual case where securities hypothetically 
owned by Senator Brown’s wife were also not deemed to be beneficially 
owned by him, if the wife traded the shares on the basis of material, non-
public information acquired by Senator Brown in violation of his duties, 
the tipping rules established by Dirks v. SEC would apply.341 Thus, Senator 
Brown’s “loophole” is much ado about nothing. 
The tipping rule, like the beneficial-ownership rule, is designed to pre-
vent a covered person from doing indirectly what he cannot do directly. In 
order to be unlawful, the tip must itself constitute a violation of the tipper’s 
duty to the source.342 To constitute a violation, the tipper must intend to re-
ceive some benefit from the tip.343 The simplest example of this would be if 
the tipper expected that the tippee would either share some of her trading 
profits or would perform some other quid pro quo. But the Supreme Court 
has also expressly stated that a benefit includes giving a gift to a relative.344 
Consequently, a member of Congress or their staffers who disclosed non-
public information to a family member would almost certainly be liable as 
a tipper.345 
What was a more reasonable concern in the CNN report was that the 
draft guidelines prepared by the House Ethics Committee (but not the 
Senate Committee on Ethics) initially took the position that provisions of 
the STOCK Act relating to prompt reporting of securities’ trades (in contrast 
to annual financial disclosures) did not cover trades by family members.346 
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I have suggested that the shaming effect of these might have a greater effect 
on discouraging congressional trading than its insider-trading provisions 
per se. For it to be effective, however, it would be preferable that it covers 
trades of beneficially owned securities. In any event, after the CNN report 
aired, Congress quickly amended the STOCK Act to clarify that the periodic 
filing requirements did apply to transactions in securities owned by a filer’s 
spouse and dependent children.347 
2. The Brazen Representative or Senator: Disclosure and 
Permission to Trade 
As discussed,  one surprising aspect of the Supreme Court’s property 
analysis is that, under the misappropriation theory, trading in securities on 
the basis of material, nonpublic information is lawful if the recipient of the 
information discloses his intent to trade to the source or if the source gives 
him permission to trade.348 Consequently, because the STOCK Act does not 
directly prohibit trading by any party but merely alludes to the misappro-
priation theory, a member of Congress might be off the hook if he publicly 
announced his intent to trade on congressional information.349 Alternately, 
Congress (or perhaps an appropriate Committee) could grant her permission 
to trade. 
Even if this were the case, these events would be so scandalous that I do 
not think that they pose much of a risk. Furthermore, even in the extremely 
unlikely event that Congress would grant such permission, the Congress 
member would still be subject to the embarrassing reporting requirements 
the Act apparently designed to discourage unseemly behavior. 
C. Property of Congress 
Congress’s decision not to define unlawful trading but merely to allude 
indirectly to the misappropriation theory raises the issue of if or when Con-
gress, the United States or the people have a proprietary right in nonpublic 
information that could be misappropriated. This is important because of the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that section 10(b) does not prohibit mere breaches 
                                                                                                                         
347 STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-173, 126 Stat. 1310 (2012). See also Walsh & Bash, 
supra note 337. The House Ethics Committee subsequently revised its memorandum to 
comply with this change. See Memorandum from the United States H.R. Comm. on Ethics 
to All House Members, Officers, and Employees: Periodic Reporting of Personal Financial 
Transactions Pursuant to the STOCK Act, as amended (Aug. 17, 2012), http://ethics.house 
.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/PTR%20amended%20pink%20sheet.pdf. 
348 See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
349 I am leaving aside the question as to the timing of this disclosure. See supra Part II. 
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of fiduciary duties, but only the fraudulent misappropriation of nonpublic 
information.350 The difficulty of applying this element in the congressional 
context illustrates the absurdity of the fact that insider trading law has de-
veloped into a de facto federal common law of intellectual property. 
The Senate Ethics Committee Memorandum reflects the uncertainty of 
the law. It states first that securities laws prohibit the “misappropriation of 
information in violation of a duty” and that members and staff “could violate” 
Rule 10b-5 if they “purchase[d] securities based on information obtained in 
the course of their official duties, or derived from their Senate position, if 
that information was material and nonpublic and they breached the duty of 
trust and confidence ....”351 I do not know whether the uncertainty expressed 
in this language is intentional, but I would note that the Memorandum other-
wise seems very carefully worded. Furthermore, it emphasizes that much 
congressional trading and even tipping will continue to be lawful: 
 
[I]nadvertently sharing information in good faith, without the intent to 
benefit from such disclosure, is not enough to violate securities laws. 
Moreover, while Senators and staff are prohibited from using nonpublic 
information for making a trade, a great deal of Congressional work is 
conducted on the public record or in the public realm during committee 
hearings and markups, floor activity, and speeches.352 
 
One of the few post-O’Hagan cases I have been able to find (other than 
the civil action against the FDA scientist that has not yet come to trial), in 
which a misappropriation case has been brought involving government infor-
mation, is United States v. Nothern.353 The DOJ alleged that the defendant, 
an officer at an investment management firm, traded as a tippee on the not-
yet public announcement by the Treasury Department that it was suspending 
the sale of 30-year Treasury Bonds. The alleged tipper, Peter Davis, was a 
consultant hired by Goldman Sachs who attended a closed Treasury press 
conference. Davis was told that attendees must keep the information strictly 
confidential until an embargo expired later that day.354 The defendant brought 
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the government alleged merely that 
the tipper had, at most, entered into a contractual confidentiality agreement 
                                                                                                                         
350 See supra notes 54–56. 
351 Senate Memorandum, supra note 333 (emphasis added). 
352 Id. 
353 United States v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 2009). In related litigation, 
Davis, the tipper, and John Youngdahl, another tippee and an economist at Goldman, pled 
guilty to criminal insider trading penalties. The defendants and Goldman Sachs also settled 
SEC enforcement actions resulting in injunctions, monetary penalties, censure and dis-
gorgement. See Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 29, at 1363–64. 
354 598 F. Supp. 2d at 170.  
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but did not allege that he had the fiduciary-type duty required under the 
misappropriation theory.355 Rejecting the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Chestman, the District Court for Massachusetts refused the motion on the 
grounds that a contractual duty was sufficiently “similar” to a fiduciary duty 
of confidentiality to satisfy the elements of O’Hagan.356 Among the issues 
not raised by the defendant, however, was whether the Treasury had a pro-
prietary interest in the information about its intent to suspend sales such that 
it was fraudulently deprived of its exclusive use of this property. 
One can also imagine types of confidential, nonpublic information that a 
representative or senator might learn in her official capacity that would not 
be proprietary to Congress. An example would be nonpublic industry or 
company-specific information supplied by constituents or lobbyists in order 
to shape proposed legislation. If anyone owns this information, it would be 
the source who would have the right to use it for its own purposes. The 
STOCK Act provides that the member of Congress would have a duty of 
confidence to Congress, the government, and the people, with respect to this 
information, because he gained it through the performance of her official 
duties. Would it be unlawful for the member of Congress to use this infor-
mation to trade the source’s securities if the source gave her permission to 
do so? 
Another problem of applying the Supreme Court’s property-based analy-
sis to congressional trading is the STOCK Act’s strange proviso that the duty 
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence only exists for the purpose 
of the insider trading rules. The negative pregnant of the proviso is that 
members of Congress and their staffers have the right to use nonpublic infor-
mation in all circumstances other than in the trading of stock. Presumably, 
this is to ensure that a senator could disclose this information to the press or 
potential voters, or that a representative could discuss information with con-
stituents, trade groups, lobbyists, or other parties who might have interest in 
potential legislation. As stated in the senate Ethics Committee Memorandum, 
the STOCK Act “is not intended ... to chill legitimate communications made 
in good faith between public officials and their constituents, inhibit gov-
ernment transparency, or otherwise hinder the dissemination of public infor-
mation about government activities.”357 Presumably, the only limitation on 
this is if a representative gave nonpublic information to a donor in the expec-
tation of a quid pro quo, in which case the tipping rules of Dirks might 
come into play as the Memorandum implies.358 The Memorandum also warns 
                                                                                                                         
355 Id. at 170–71. 
356 Id. at 174–75 (noting that in a parenthetical in O’Hagan, Justice Ginsburg used the 
formulation “some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation”). 
357 Senate Memorandum, supra note 333, at 1. 
358 Id. at 2. 
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that disclosure of confidential information “received in a closed, nonpublic 
hearing; information gathered during the confidential stages of a committee 
investigation; and classified national security information” might violate 
Senate Rule 29.5, might subject a senator to expulsion or a staffer to dis-
missal, and might be grounds for a sanction such as contempt.359 
But does this also suggest that Congress, the government, and the people 
in fact do not have a proprietary interest in the information (understood as 
the right to exclusive use)? That is, Congress seems to be disclaiming own-
ership of the information. 
Perhaps one could strain and answer that if Congress owned this in-
formation, then it follows that it also has the right to alienate it any way it 
sees fit, including giving a senator the right to use it for any purpose except 
one. Obviously, limitations in use are contained in intellectual property li-
censes all the time. The problem with this argument is that under trade secret 
law, one only has proprietary rights in information so long as one takes ef-
forts to protect its secrecy. It would seem, therefore, that by giving people 
the right to use and disclose information generally, with only one exception, 
Congress would lose its proprietary right in the information. In any event, this 
illustrates the awkwardness of trying to shoehorn a concern about congres-
sional integrity into a property-based anti-fraud regime. 
D. Information “Of a Sort Ordinarily Used” in Trading Securities 
Perhaps the most problematic element of an SEC civil action, a con-
temporaneous trader’s private right of action, or a DOJ prosecution of a 
member of Congress or its staffers under the ’34 Act, would be the limita-
tion announced by the majority in O’Hagan that the material, nonpublic 
information be of a sort ordinarily used in the trading of securities to reap 
risk-free profits. This is necessary to satisfy the element of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 that the fraud be “in connection with” the purchase or sale 
of securities. As discussed above, Justice Thomas, correctly in my opinion, 
chastened Justice Ginsburg for not explaining what this might mean.360 She 
assumed the very facts that she says needs to be proven. The case law under 
the misappropriation theory is not much more helpful in giving meaning to 
this limitation. Indeed, it is not clear what remains of this element. 
1. Specific Information 
A student note by Bud Jerke361 on the related subject of trading on the ba-
sis of political intelligence provides the following anecdote: On November 16, 
                                                                                                                         
359 Id. at 3. 
360 See supra Part II.D. 
361 See Jerke, supra note 324. 
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2005, Senate Majority Leader William Frist announced that there would 
be a Senate vote on an asbestos trust fund bill that had been languishing in 
Congress for years. The timing of this announcement had, apparently, been 
kept secret. Nevertheless, the day before the announcement saw significant 
increases in trading in three companies, which were defendants in asbestos 
litigation.362 This is evidence that some persons did in fact trade on the 
basis of this information. It was also apparently true that a previous push to 
pass this legislation caused the prices of the stock of these issuers to increase, 
suggesting that information about the potential legislation was material to 
investors in asbestos defendants. Does this make it information of a sort that 
is ordinarily traded on to make risk-free profits? Certainly it has other finan-
cial uses for those and other asbestos defendants, as well as asbestos plaintiffs 
and their respective attorneys, and also their creditors who are trying to make 
decisions in light of the on-going information. It might also have financial 
implications for other companies who are or might be the target of mass tort 
litigation and, perhaps, for the tort law bar as a whole. Once again, this raises 
the question as to what the word “ordinarily” is supposed to mean. 
Another group of students led by Matthew Barbabella, in discussing 
economic arguments for and against the regulation of congressional trading, 
poses the following hypothetical: 
Imagine you are a financially savvy United States congressional repre-
sentative. In a week, you intend to announce the proposal of an appro-
priations bill that will award a huge, no-bid contract to a publicly traded 
energy company. You expect the news to sharply increase the price of 
that company’s stock. Enticed by this foolproof investment opportunity, 
you decide to purchase shares of stock in the company that will be re-
ceiving the contract….363 
At first blush, as this information, according to the hypo, pertains to 
firm-specific financial conditions of a specific company and is expected to 
“sharply increase” its stock price, it would seem to be an easier case of in-
formation “of a sort ordinarily used” in purchasing that stock. On closer 
examination, however, there are other financial uses of the information. For 
example, if the member of Congress were a little smarter, he could have 
shorted the stock of companies that did not receive the contract. 
Jerke lists a number of questionable trades by specific members of 
Congress.364 For example, according to a study by Professor Gregory Boller: 
                                                                                                                         
362 Id. at 1454–56 (“Fueled primarily by hedge funds, K Street lobbyists (including 
lawyer-lobbyists at several prominent law firms) have cultivated the lucrative niche of fer-
reting out little-known political information and funneling it to Wall Street.”). 
363 Barbabella et al., supra note 4, at 200. 
364 See Jerke, supra note 324, at 1461–67. 
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On Feb. 22, 1991, then-Sen. Bentsen purchased stock (reported as between 
$1,000 and $15,000 in value) in food and dairy company Morningstar 
Foods. Four days later, an amendment to the National School Lunch Act 
was introduced in the Senate to diversify milk choices for lunch pro-
grams. On Dec. 23, 1991, Bentsen sold his stock. Eight days later, 
Morningstar came under a Justice Department probe into bid-rigging to 
sell milk in public schools.365 
He concludes that “this anecdote suggests that former Senator Bentsen 
knew not only when to purchase stock in a company that would benefit 
from legislation but also when to sell stock that would be detrimentally 
affected by a governmental investigation.”366 
Once again (and assuming, as Jerke apparently does, that the price of the 
issuer’s stock was affected by these two events and that the Senator learned 
of the DOJ probe through his official capacity), there is a question as to 
whether these were information “of a sort ordinarily used” in the trading of 
Morningstar stock. And, once again, it could also be used to invest in the 
stock of rival dairies who would now be able to bid for government contracts, 
or even in companies that provide alternate beverages or foods to schools. 
The closest reported case alleging unlawful trading by a governmental 
official on governmental information is the pre-O’Hagan case of United 
States v. Bryan.367 The West Virginia Lottery Commission Director rigged 
the granting of valuable contracts to favored bidders, and purchased shares in 
the winning company prior to the announcement of the award. The Fourth 
Circuit upheld his conviction under the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud statutes 
on the grounds that he fraudulently deprived the citizens of the state of “their 
right to [receive] his honest services,” relying in part on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carpenter.368 The court, however, overturned his conviction for 
                                                                                                                         
365 See id. at 1463 (quoting Joy Ward, Taking Stock in Congress, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–
Oct. 1995, at 16 (summarizing Boller’s findings)). 
366 Id. 
367 According to the court: 
[I]n principle, if not in reality, these courts would be obliged to find lia-
bility in the case of simple theft by an employee, even where no fiduciary 
duty has been breached, for the raison d’etre of the misappropriation 
theory in fact is concern over “the unfairness inherent in trading on 
[stolen] information.” 
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted)). It states further: “we 
tread cautiously in extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships, lest our ef-
forts to construe Rule 10b-5 lose method and predictability, taking over ‘the whole corpo-
rate universe.’” Id. at 959 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 
1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 
(1977)), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)). 
368 58 F.3d at 943. 
236 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159 
insider trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it rejected the 
misappropriation theory: 
In contravention of this established principle, the misappropriation theory 
authorizes criminal conviction for simple breaches of fiduciary duty and 
similar relationships of trust and confidence, whether or not the breaches 
entail deception within the meaning of section 10(b) and whether or not 
the parties wronged by the breaches were purchasers or sellers of secu-
rities, or otherwise connected with or interested in the purchase or sale 
of securities.369 
In a long and detailed examination of the Supreme Court’s pre-
O’Hagan 10b-5 jurisprudence, the court found that securities fraud was 
limited to deception of participants in the securities markets and could not 
be extended to a “federal common law governing and protecting any and all 
trust relationships.”370 Nagy argues that today, after O’Hagan, there is “no 
question” that the Director or another government officer could be convicted 
for insider trading on similar facts even before passage of the STOCK Act.371 
I do not believe that this is so clear if the requisite duty under the misappro-
priation theory must be fiduciary or its functional equivalent. 
The Fourth Circuit did not find that the Director had a fiduciary duty to 
the state regarding this information. Indeed, it strongly implied that he had no 
such duty. It based its decision on the mail-fraud conviction based on the 
fact that he had violated an oath to execute his duties in an “honest, legal, and 
efficient manner” and avoid conflicts of interest.372 However, it rejected the 
government’s argument that he committed securities fraud when he breached 
“his duty of confidentiality and his statutory obligation to refrain from using 
his position for personal gain” because of its concern about the uncertainty 
that would be caused by finding new, broad fiduciary duties.373 “As the 
Second Circuit noted in Chestman, ‘[t]he existence of fiduciary duties in ... 
common law settings’ outside the shareholder relations context ‘is anything 
but clear.’”374 It is not clear whether Bryan would be decided differently to-
day under the Supreme Court’s formulation of the misappropriation theory. 
2. General Market Information 
The examples that these note writers discuss are analogous to insider 
trading cases that have been brought against non-congressional actors be-
cause they involve firm-specific, nonpublic information used to trade in 
                                                                                                                         
369 Id. at 944. 
370 Id. at 945–50. 
371 Nagy, Entrustment, supra note 2, at 1154. 
372 58 F.3d at 941 n.2. 
373 Id. at 945 (citation omitted). 
374 Id. at 951. 
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securities of that firm. Once one moves beyond legislation intended to af-
fect a single issuer or industry, the application of the STOCK Act becomes 
more problematical. 
For example, soon after 60 Minutes ran its exposé on congressional 
trading, Roger Parloff published a denunciation in Fortune that showed 
unusual sophistication in his understanding of the law, going so far as to cite 
the debate between Nagy and Bainbridge.375 He, however, gives the follow-
ing example of the “problem”: 
 
During the 60 Minutes segment, Hoover Institute fellow Peter Schweizer 
(author of the recent book Throw Them All Out) asserted that in mid-
September 2008, Alabama representative Spencer Bachus, then the 
ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, attended 
closed-door meetings at which Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and 
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke warned congressional leaders 
that a global financial meltdown was imminent. “Literally the next day,” 
according to the Schweizer, Bachus bought stock options in funds that 
would make money if the market went down.376 
 
If these types of broad, economy-wide information were to be consid-
ered “of a sort,” then the STOCK Act would seem to prohibit any and all 
trading in publicly issued securities by Congress and its staff.377 If this was 
Congress’s intent, would it not have been simpler merely to provide so 
directly by requiring all members to place their investments in blind trusts, 
as many of them do already? 
This example also raises the issue as to what it means for information 
to be nonpublic. Except for, perhaps, last-minute amendments made on the 
floor, the possibilities of much legislation have been discussed both publicly 
and privately, within and outside of Congress, by large numbers of mem-
bers of Congress and their staff, lobbyists, pundits, and the like. As such, 
would the “nonpublic” part of the information be the likelihood that a bill 
would actually be introduced or would pass both Houses and be signed by 
                                                                                                                         
375 Roger Parloff, It’s Time To Ban Insider Trading by Congress, FORTUNE (Nov. 18, 
2011, 10:18 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/18/insider-trading-congress/. 
376 Id. 
377 A reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer speculated that this might be a reason that 
the SEC has declined to investigate Congressional trading. 
Members of Congress are not like regulators, who typically focus on a 
single sector of the economy; they make laws for everyone. To prevent 
any conflicts of interest, members who invest would have to abstain from 
most congressional business, or they would have to be prevented from 
buying virtually any stocks, said an individual familiar with Congress 
and its relations with business. 
DiStefano, supra note 6. 
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the President?378 As George Canellos, co-chief of the SEC’s enforcement 
division has said, “when it comes to market-moving information coming 
from Congress ‘the lines aren’t quite as bright and the opportunities for argu-
ments by the defense [in an insider trading action] are greater.’”379  
In the specific example cited by Parloff, when Representative Bachus and 
his colleagues met with Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke, it was 
hardly news that the global economy was in a crisis. It was well known that 
the Treasury and the Fed were desperately lobbying Congress to approve the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program, or TARP,380 after Lehman Brothers had 
filed for bankruptcy, the government had taken over AIG, a major money-
market fund had broken the buck, and the markets were panicking.381 
As already discussed, the Senate Memorandum already concludes that 
much congressional work should be deemed public.382 The House Memo-
randum, however, cautions: 
Members and employees may obtain material nonpublic information about 
a public company or economic sector (e.g., energy, telecommunications, 
or healthcare) during the course of their official duties or in their personal 
capacity from family, friends, acquaintances, or from their own involve-
ment with a company. If the Member or employee chooses to trade on 
this information, they may have engaged in insider trading.”383 
                                                                                                                         
378 This raises yet another issue that has plagued trade secret jurisprudence. Under 
Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, misstatements and omissions are only actionable if they involve 
material information. Pending legislation would also seem to be “contingent” infor-
mation—that is, it may or may not ever be adopted. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988), the Supreme Court held that whether or not a contingent event is “material” with-
in the meaning of the securities laws is determined by balancing its probability against its 
magnitude. That is, an event that, if it were to occur, would have an extremely large effect 
on an issuer might be material even if it were relatively unlikely, but even a very likely 
event might not be material if the expected effect were small. Id. at 238-41. 
When would pending legislation become material on this standard? The problem is that 
it is likely that the greater both the magnitude of the effect and the probability of enactment, 
also the more likely that both would be widely known. That is, the more material legislation 
becomes, more likely that it is no longer nonpublic. 
379 Brody Mullins, Jean Eaglesham & Devlin Barrett, Probe of How U.S. Agency’s 
Medicare Move Reached Investors Hits Wall, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:50 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304607104579210320473074320. 
380 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261 (2008)). 
381 Notoriously, at one of the meetings with Congressional representatives Secretary 
Paulson stated: “If [TARP] doesn’t pass, then heaven help us all.” Deborah Solomon et al., 
Shock Forced Paulson’s Hand, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB122186563104158747.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
382 Senate Memorandum, supra note 333, at 1. 
383 Memorandum, New Ethics Requirements, supra note 277, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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These perhaps insuperable line-drawing problems are probably one rea-
son why a proposed provision limiting “political intelligence”384 was de-
leted from the STOCK Act before passage and referred to further study.385 
CONCLUSION 
The STOCK Act was enacted to address a public relations problem, not 
a real legal problem. It “closed” a non-existent loophole that supposedly 
exempted Congress and its staff from the federal securities laws. It did not, 
unfortunately, address very real legal and jurisprudential problems. The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of insider trading law, which is based on 
prohibiting fraud and protecting intellectual property, is unclear and poorly 
suited to the concerns of market and government integrity. The STOCK Act 
does little to clarify when congressional trading specifically would be unlaw-
ful, let alone attempt to define insider trading generally. Its effects are likely 
to be marginal. Its requirement that members and staff promptly report secu-
rities trades may lead to more transparency. Its use of the language “duty 
of trust and confidence” might be interpreted as endorsing the language of 
Rules 10b5-1 and 2 applicable to other traders. I doubt that it will lead to 
significant SEC or DOJ litigation. 
                                                                                                                         
384 Political intelligence is information gleaned by consultants from conversations with 
Congress, lobbyists, etc. about upcoming legislation that is then sold to clients. Brody 
Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Buying ‘Political Intelligence’ Can Pay Off Big for Wall Street, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at A1.  
385 The STOCK Act directs the Comptroller General to submit “a report on the role of 
political intelligence in the financial markets” within twelve months of the enactment of the 
act. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 112-
105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
